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Vietnamese Land Reform: The Domestic Impetus to Communist Compromises at
Geneva, 1954

Robert Callahan

Introduction

Fighting for fifty-five consecutive days and nights, Vietnamese resistance forcesthe Vietminh - scored a devastating victory over the French at Dienbienphu on May 7,
1954. The chains of 100 years of French colonialism were close to being broken; long
awaited independence and unification appeared to be at hand. One day after the historic
victory, the Vietnamese entered negotiations for an end to the war at Geneva, seemingly
in a position of strength after almost nine years of successful warfare against the French.
Yet, as the historian Marilyn Young stated, the final settlement of the 1954
Geneva Conference "reflected neither the aspirations of the Vietnamese people nor the
\

military and political victory of the Viet Minh."} According to the terms ofthe
agreement, Vietnam was temporarily divided into two "regrouping zones" along the 17th
paralle1. 2 The Vietminh was to relocate its forces to the North, the French to the South.

Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991),37.
The Accords called for free general elections to reunify the nation in two years (July 1956) under the
supervision of an international commission composed of Polish, Canadian, and Indian representatives.
Specific articles prohibited the introduction of additional military personnel, troop reinforcements,
ammunition, arms, and new military bases or bases under foreign control into the two regrouping zones and
also forbade the two civil administrations from entering military alliances. "The Geneva Cease-Fire," July
20, 1954, in Vietnam and America: A Documented History, 2d ed., Marvin Gettleman and others, ed. (New
York: Grove Press, 1995),70-72.
The settlement also called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese and French forces from Laos and
Cambodia, as well as the neutralization of both countries under their existing royal governments. The
Pathet Lao, though, was allocated "two small, underpopulated regroupment zones," but the space hardly
reflected the party's actual military control over the country. Young, Vietnam Wars, 41. Perhaps most
importantly, the "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference" stressed that the military demarcation line
was "provisional" and "should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial
boundary." "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference," July 21, 1954, in Vietnam and America,
1

2
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Acceptance of the seventeenth parallel, rather than the thirteenth or fourteenth,
represented a setback, considering the land in between included such notable cities as
Hue, the ancient imperial capital, and Danang. As the historian Harold C. Hinton pointed
out, the thirteenth or fourteenth ''would have corresponded fairly closely with the actual
military situation. 3
One prominent question that arose from the Geneva settlement was why the
leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam compromised so many of their initial
demands and goals, including the one seemingly most dear to them - national unification.
Examinations of the DRV's compromises at Geneva in the existing historical scholarship
of the Vietnamese Revolution focus almost exclusively on the Cold War context in which
the demands for independence were heard. 4 Certainly, the realties of the Cold War had a
significant impact on the negotiations at Geneva, particularly the threat of a direct United
States military intervention. In a report given by Ho Chi Minh to the Sixth Plenum of the
15, 1954, Ho called on the Party to "take firm
Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP) 5 on July
\

Gettleman et aI., ed., 75. The State of Vietnam did not sign the agreements, a stipulation the United States
would later use to back Ngo Dinh Diem and the Republic of Vietnam's refusal to honor the Geneva
Accords and the national elections scheduled for 1956.
3 Extract from Harold C. Hmton, Communist China in World Politics, in China's Foreign Relations Since
1949, Alan Lawrance (London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 135.
4 Qiang Zhai 's book, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2000) discusses the Geneva Conference exclusively in terms of the role of Zhou Enlai and Chinese
pressure. In fact, the heading for his section on Geneva is entitled, "Zhou Enlai and the Geneva
Conference." Exclusive Cold War interpretations of the Geneva Conference can also be found in Marilyn
Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990, William Duiker's, Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), William Pinckney's, The Endless War: Fifty Years ojStruggle in
Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1982), Joseph Buttinger's, Vietnam: A Political History (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), and King Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1969). All of these texts mention the threat of an American invasion and
pressure from the "socialist bloc" as the main factors in the DRV's decision to compromise.
S The Vietnamese Communists had several different names for the party between 1930 and 1954. In
February 1930, largely because ofHo Chi Minh's leadership, the three competing communist parties of
Vietnam (Indochinese Communist Party, Annam Communist Party, and the Indochinese Communist
League) merged together to form the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP). Under guidance from the
Comintem, a Soviet organization created by Lenin in 1919 to give leadership to the world socialist
movement, the Party changed its name to the Indochinese Communist Party in October 1930. From 1930

3

hold of the banner ofpeace to oppose the U.S. imperialists' policy of direct inference in,
and prolongation and expansion of, the war in Indochina.... ,,6 He further chided cadres
who "intoxicated with our repeated victories, want to fight on at all costs." These cadres,
Ho noted, "see the French but not the Americans."?
The DRV's socialist brethren, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of
China, also applied intense pressure on Pham Van Dong and the leaders of the Vietnam
Workers' Party to moderate their stance to avoid an American expansion of the war.

8

The Chinese, in particular, had fresh memories of the brutal Korean War and did not
want to get involved in a similar conflict that would divert precious economic and human
resources away from domestic issues and economic rehabilitation. As the historian
Qiang Zhai pointed out in his book, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, the leaders
of the DRV were in no position to alienate the People's Republic of China at the Geneva
Conference in light of the crucial role Chinese assistance played in their victory over the
French and their future need for

assistan~e

in the rebuilding of the country after the

settlement. "Between 1950-1954, Beijing sent some of its most capable generals to
Vietnam as military and political advisors; they helped the DRV professionalize and
politicize its army, reorganize its administrative structure, establish a sound financial

to 1951, the Party operated under the ICP name. In 1941, however, the Party, in an attempt to form a
multi-class alliance against imperialism, formed the Vietminh Front. The Party attempted to cloak its role
and move away from overt communist leadership in order to attract moderate nationalist into the Front.
The Vietminh lasted for a decade. In 1951, the Party reaffmned the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the
Revolution and formed the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP).
6 "Report by Ho Chi Minh to the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee," July 15, 1954, in Gareth
Porter, ed., Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation ofHuman Decisions, Vol. 1, (Stanfordville, New York:
Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, 1979),635.
7 Ibid., 636.
8 I use the term "leaders of the Vietnam Workers' Party" to refer to the major actors in the Communist
leadership, most notably Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Pham Van Dong. Later,
when Truong Chinh was relieved of his post as General Secretary in 1956, Le Duan would be promoted to
the central leadership in Hanoi.
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policy, and mobilize the masses.,,9 In addition, Chinese military advisers "planned and
often helped direct Viet Minh operations," and, as a whole, the Chinese Military
Advisory Group "contributed greatly to the success ofthe border, Northwest, and Dien
Bien Phu engagements.,,10
Other historians have suggested that the practical side of Ho Chi Minh played a
key role in the compromises at Geneva, namely that Ho was buying time to regroup his
forces and giving the Vietnamese people a much needed break after almost fifteen years
of constant warfare. Statements made by Ho Chi Minh during key discussions with Vo
Nyugen Giap and Zhou Enlai from July 3 to July 5 at Liuzhou gives evidence to both his
fears of an American intervention and claims that he was buying time to regroup his
forces. In agreeing with Zhou about the need for compromise, Ho stated:

We must have good talks with France to obtain peace before U.S.
November elections take place because the United States has misgivings
about intervention. After November, we are not certain what its position
will be. Vietnam is at a G[ossroad of peace and war. Our main direction is
to win peace and prepare for war. I I
William J. Duiker, author of the biography Ho Chi Minh, also noted the practical,
"making peace to go forward" claim for Ho's willingness to compromise at Geneva:

His willingness to accept a compromise peace en route to his final
objective is reminiscent of his views on previous occasions, notably at the
end of the Pacific War. Ho Chi Minh recognized that national
independence and unity for the Vietnamese nation could not be achieved
in isolation, but must be achieved in the context of complex changes
taking place on the world's stage. 12

Qiang Zhai, China and Vietnam, 63.
Ibid.
11 Ibid., 60.
12 Duiker, Ho Chi Minh (New York: Hyperion, 2000) 461.

9

10
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Some historians have also suggested that Ho Chi Minh and the Party leadership
made the compromises because they felt the free and general election provision of the
settlement would result in a Communist victory with Ho as the president of an
independent, united Vietnam. The Accords did clearly state that the military demarcation
line was "provisional" and "should not be in any way be interpreted as constituting a
political or territorial boundary," and the DRV leadership stressed this in repeated
appeals after the conference about the transition from military to political struggle. Yet,
as Ang Cheng Guan stated in the beginning ofher book, Vietnamese Communists'
Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, "The Vietnamese Communist
leadership ...knew from the beginning that the general election stipulated in the 1954
Geneva Agreements would not take place." She cited the 6th Plenary Session of the
Vietnam Workers' Party (July 15-18, 1954) as evidence of Hanoi's implicit
acknowledgement that it would be unlikely to reunite the country in 1956 by election in
the face of American imperialism. 13 ~g Cheng Guan also noted a Spring 1959 meeting
in which Le Duan told Janos Radvanyi that "no one in Hanoi had been surprised when
the election was not held" and that the "election issue was kept alive because it had great
propaganda value" in terms of presenting the DRV on the side of legality and as an
injured party. 14 At the very least, if reunification could not be achieved through
elections in 1956, the intervening years would give the DRV time to regroup and rebuild
economically.

13 Ang Chen Guan, Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict
(Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 1997), 12.

14

Ibid.
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While Cold War realities, the threat of American intervention, and intense
Chinese and Soviet pressure all contributed significantly to the DRV's decision to
compromise, little attention has been paid to the equally important domestic reasons.
Many of these domestic reasons stem from the devastating effects of French colonialism
on Vietnam, particularly on the countryside, where close to 90% ofthe population lived.
Decades ofland expropriations and direct concessions to French colonists and
Vietnamese "collaborators" led to land being concentrated in the hands of large, wealthy
landlords. IS Owning little or no land, Vietnamese peasants became entrenched in a cycle
of debt, unable to break free from usury interest rates, exorbitant land rents, and
suffocating taxes imposed by landlords who doubled as village elites.
For the Vietnamese Communists, land reform was the short-term solution to
problems oflandlessness and extreme rural poverty. It involved, in the words of Chinese
and Vietnamese land reform historian Edwin Moise, ''much more than taking land from
the landlords and giving it to the poor; it was directed against all the sources from which
the old rural elite drew its power.,,16 Land reform was an agrarian revolution aimed at
both the destruction of the traditional landlord-gentry elite and the creation of a "new
group of rural leaders who would ally themselves with revolutionary leaders at the
national level as well as with the peasant masses from among whom they had come.,,17
Since the power of traditional rural elites came from owning large amounts of land, the
division and redistribution of it to peasants was central to the process of rural
For a detailed analysis of French colonial land policies, see Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution:
Vietnamese Peasants under the French (New York: Colwnbia University Press, 1973; reprint 1991),
Christine White, "Agrarian Reform and National Liberation in the Vietnamese Revolution, 1920-1957"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Cornell, 1981), and Pham Cao Duong, Vietnamese Peasants Under French
Domination, 1861-1945 (Berkeley, California: University Press of America, 1985).
16 Edwin Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village
Level (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983),4.
15
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transfonnation. The process of giving "land to the tillers" would do more than just
satisfy peasant demands for land, release the forces of production, and bring the majority
population to power in the countryside. It would also lay the important groundwork for
the transition to socialism and the future collectivization of agriculture - the ultimate
solution to increasing production and improving the standard of living in the countryside.
The Vietnamese Communists took a number of different approaches to agrarian
refonn between 1930 and 1954. Specific policies regarding land refonn during those
years shifted with changing international and domestic conditions. From the founding of
the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1930 to the fonnation of a popular front
government in France in 1936, the Communist leadership implemented a radical land
refonn that confiscated all lands belonging to foreign and native landlords, regardless of
their stance toward the national revolution. During this period, reflecting the stance of
the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin's analysis of Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the
Chinese Communists, the rcp

emphasi~ed

the centrality of class struggle over

nationalism in post-World War r society. At the same time, brutal living conditions in
the countryside and peasant unrest in Nghe-an and Ha-tinh provinces served to push the
Party's agrarian policies in a more radical direction.
The rumblings of World War II, however, changed the overarching context for
agrarian refonn in Vietnam and led to the moderation ofland policies. Following the
guidance of the Seventh Comintern Congress and Stalin's new analysis that the primary
threat to the international working class headed by the Soviet Union was fascism rather
than imperialism, the rcp stopped its policy of confiscating French and native landlord

17

Ibid.
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lands to fonn alliances with all progressive, anti-fascist forces in 1936. 18 After the
fonnation of a French popular front government that included that nation's Communist
Party in 1936, the Party mobilized peasants to demand refonns within the colonial
system. Hitler's stunning defeat of France and the subsequent collaboration of the new
Vichy puppet government with Japan, though, forced the Party to re-evaluate its
revolutionary framework and land policies. 19
Looking increasingly to the experiences of the Chinese Communists in its War of
Resistance to Japan, the Vietnamese Communists found an overarching framework for
the Revolution in Mao's concept of "new democracy." The founding of the Vietminh in
1941 crystallized the Party's commitment to "new democracy" and the establishment of a
broad united front of all progressive, anti-imperialist forces. During World War II, the
ICP, acting under the auspices of the Vietminh, carried out a policy of confiscating only
those lands belonging to French landlords and native "collaborators" in order to promote
the united front and fonn the strongest ,\esistance possible to Japanese and French
imperialism. Moderate land policies, for a number of international and domestic reasons,
would continue even after the Vietminh's seizure of power during the August Revolution
in 1945. The presence of hostile Allied powers in the North and South, combined with
the serious threat of countrywide famine, limited the Party's ability to address the

18 Rejecting the Second International's support of World War I and betrayal of socialism, Lenin and the
Soviet leadership created the Comintern, also known as the Third International, in 1919 to aid and give
leadership to the international proletarian revolution. Ho Chi Minh began his involvement with the
Comintern in 1923, when he worked at its headquarters in Moscow and attended a training institute for
Third World revolutionaries. Joseph Stalin took over leadership of the Comintern in 1928 after his purge
of Nikolai Bukharin. William Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 2d ed. (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 16-17.
19 The Vichy government was the Nazi puppet government installed in France after Germany's successful
invasion in 1940. In August 1940, the Vichy government reached an agreement with Japan, by which the
"Japanese formally recognized French sovereignty in Indochina in return for military facilities and transit
rights through Indochina and the right to station troops in Tonkin. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 62
63.
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agrarian question. Likewise, the return of the French and their attempt to win a
"lightning war" in 1946-1947 made agrarian reform less than a top priority for Party
leaders struggling for mere survival. From 1941 to 1951, the Party repeatedly
emphasized the necessity of maintaining the broad national united front and
subordinating the anti-feudal task to the interests of national liberation.
While moderate policies of rent reduction and confiscation of ''traitor'' lands
characterized, for the most part, the years of the national united front against French and
Japanese imperialism, more radical policies emerged after the establishment of the Bao
Dai regime in the South and the increasing intervention ofthe United States in the early
1950s. In short, a new domestic competitor was sharpening class divisions in the
countryside and a new foreign threat was aiding the French militarily and monetarily to
lengthen the Resistance War; under these circumstances, the need and pressure for a more
radical land reform grew after the Second Congress of the Party in 1951. At the same
time, the Party felt obliged to pursue a ~ore radical land reform to compensate the poor
and landless peasants, who were the most enthusiastic participants both in the Revolution
and in the people's armed forces. There was a sense among Party leaders that peasants
deserved land after their enormous sacrifices and sufferings during the protracted
conflicts.
Having neglected and placed promises of "land to the tiller" on the back burner
for thirteen years, the Party finally implemented a more comprehensive land reform to
meet the needs of the Revolution in late 1953. These needs included mobilizing peasants
for the Resistance War and support of the Party, satisfying peasant demands for land in
compensation for their many sacrifices during the wars with France and Japan, purifying

•
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the Party's ranks of landlords and rich peasants, winning the long-tenn support of the
peasantry, and undennining the new Bao Dai regime in Saigon. In undertaking a radical
land refonn in 1953, the Party was gambling that the benefits ofland refonn, particularly
the mobilization of poor and landless peasants, would outweigh the costs of breaking
unity in the national united front. Land refonn was instrumental in the future success of
the Vietnamese Revolution in the minds of the Party leadership, particularly facing the
prospect of a protracted war with the United States, and it needed relatively peaceful and
stable conditions to undertake and consolidate the program.
By late 1953 and early 1954, VWP leaders were calling for the Resistance War to
be "sped up" in order to ensure the "success of land refonn." Speeding up the Resistance
War meant applying more pressure against France on the military front in the hopes of
bringing about a negotiated settlement, which Ho Chi Minh deemed essential for
avoiding a direct United States military intervention. Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of
the Vietminh forces, indicated in an aPReal on the beginning of the Dienbienphu
campaign, that the battle would make a "worthy contribution to the world peace
movement.,,20 He also indicated that the battle, the purpose of which was to bring about a
negotiated settlement, would help to "ensure the success ofland refonn." Ho Chi Minh
also told the Party in a major speech in December 1953 that it had to "speed up the
Resistance War in order to ensure the success ofland refonn.,,21 A political settlement to
the war was important not only because it would temporarily prevent a direct U.S.

"Appeal by Giap to All Cadres and Fighters, Units, and Services, on Beginning the Dienbienphu
Campaign, March 1954," in Gareth Porter, ed., Vietnam: A History in Documents (New York: Earl M.
Coleman Enterprises, Inc., 1979), 131.
21 Ho Chi Minh, "Report to the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," December
1953 in Bernard Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh On Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920-1966 (New York:
FrederickA. Praeger, Publishers, 1967),258.
20
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military intervention but also because it would allow the Party to undertake a land refonn
projected to mobilize millions of peasants for a future protracted war with the United
States. The Communist leadership knew that land refonn would mobilize the peasantry
because of the land refonn experiences of the Chinese Communist Party in its successful
bid for power after Wodd War II, a fact noted by Ho Chi Minh in his speech announcing
the radical land refonn in 1953. After the Korean armistice, the United States showed
more overt signs of directly intervening in Vietnam through its huge financial and
military contributions to the French. American politicians also made comments
indicating a future American intervention.
The only way that the Vietnamese Communists could temporarily prevent a direct
American military intervention while implementing the crucial land refonn needed for a
future protracted war with the U.S. was to compromise and reach a political settlement at
Geneva. Truong Chinh, party theoretician and chief architect of the land refonn,
indicated that the Party needed re1ative1~ stable and peaceful conditions to carry out the
radical land refonn policy. A political settlement at Geneva would have provided the
very conditions necessary for the successful implementation of the land refonn
considered so vital to the ultimate, long-tenn success of the Revolution.
To grasp the centrality ofland refonn, we must begin with an overview ofthe
history of the Vietnamese Communists' approaches to rural transfonnation. Among the
issues to explore are the various agrarian policies undertaken by the Vietnamese
Communists between 1930 and 1954 as well as the overarching contexts for those
policies.

•
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Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party and the Nghe-Tinh Rural Revolt

In February 1930, under guidance from the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin, the
three competing Communist parties of Vietnam merged under the leadership ofHo Chi
Minh to form a revolutionary political party of the working class devoted to the twin
tasks of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. Upon the merger, Ho laid out the main
slogans of the new party, which included the establishment of a "worker-peasant and
soldier government," the confiscation of "banks and other enterprises belonging to
imperialists," and, in terms of agrarian reform, the confiscation of "plantations and
property belonging to the imperialists and the Vietnamese reactionary capitalist class.',22
Such lands confiscated from imperialists and "reactionary" Vietnamese capitalists would
then be distributed to poor peasants. In a strategy document approved at the unity
conference, Ho stressed the need to form a broad coalition and to reach out to nationalist
groups, intellectuals, patriotic rich peasants and landlords, and the petty bourgeoisie. As
William Duiker noted perceptibly in, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Ho Chi
Minh "reiterated his conviction of the importance of national independence to the cause
of the Vietnamese Revolution" by naming the new Party, the Vietnam Communist
party?3 In only eight short months, though, facing criticism from Moscow, the Party
would change its name to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) to better reflect

22 Ho Chi Minh, "Appeal Made on the Occasion of the Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party," in
Ho Chi Minh Selected Writings 1920-1969 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977),41.
Both William Duiker, in the Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1996) and James Pinckney Harrison in The Endless War: Fifty Years ofStruggle in Vietnam (New York:
The Free Press, 1982), indicated that the Party's name change occurred at the First Plenum of the Party's
Central Committee in October 1930. Since Ho's appeal was written in February 1930, the Party should be
called the Vietnam Communist Party. Yet, in all translations of this piece I encountered, the words
"Indochinese Communist Party" appear in the title. I am not sure of the origin of this discrepancy.
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proletarian internationalism and the centrality of class struggle over nationalism in the
post-World War I world.
Ho Chi Minh's program for the Vietnam Communist Party was at odds in many
ways with the official Comintern line that had propagated in 1928. The Sixth Comintem
Congress held that year had called on Communist parties in colonial countries to reject
alliances with the bourgeoisie and to increase working class membership. The decisions
reflected Stalin's increasingly radical bent in Soviet domestic affairs and his analysis of
the bloody betrayal ofthe Communists by Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Party in
1927, a betrayal that wrecked the carefully constructed united front in China. The
formation ofthe Indochinese Communist Party in October 1930 under the leadership of
Tran Phu, who had been trained in Moscow at the Communist University of the Peoples
of the East, and its subsequent program, the "October Theses," repudiated much of Ho
Chi Minh's work in February and signaled a move away from his more nationalistic,
united front approach to the revolution. \ The "October Theses" argued that "the struggle
ofthe worker-peasant masses has taken on a very clearly independent character and is no
longer influenced by nationalism as it used to be."
In terms of agrarian policy, the document called for the Party to
confiscate all lands belonging to foreign and native landlords and to
religious organizations, and hand them over to middle and poor peasants,
the right of ownership being in the hands of the worker-peasant
government. 24
The confiscation of all lands belonging to landlords, regardless of their stance toward the
national revolution, represented a major shift from Ho Chi Minh's agrarian policies in

Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 33.
Christine White, "Agrarian Refonn and National Liberation in the Vietnamese Revolution, 1920-1957"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Cornell, 1981), 54.

23

24

•
14

February. During the founding of the Vietnam Communist Party in February 1930, Ho
suggested that only property belonging to imperialists and reactionary Vietnamese
capitalists should be confiscated, hinting at the toleration of landlords and other
exploiting native elements if they supported the cause of national liberation.
Comintern policy contributed to the ICP's rejection ofHo Chi Minh's more
modest agrarian policies and efforts at forming a broad national united front against
imperialism and feudalism. It was particularly difficult to sustain Ho's argument for a
united front and for collaboration with "bourgeois" nationalist elements when these very
forces had turned on the Communists in China only three years earlier. Moreover, there
were also strong domestic forces pushing the ICP toward a more radical land reform line
in late 1930. Between February and October 1930 "there had been a wave of strikes and
peasant demonstrations which had culminated in the collapse of colonial control and the
establishment of peasant self-government in several villages in Nghe-an province in
September.,,25 The "October Party Pro~," according to Christine White, was
in part a reflection of the situation in the country at the time, when
peasants who had never heard the terms 'class struggle,' the 'Communist
International,' 'class against class' , and 'soviets,' overthrew the councils
of notables and chose people among themselves to act as the new village
govemment. 26
The early upsurge, in part "launched, and continually supported by Communist Party
activities," outstripped the Party's initial objectives and expectations. 27
The peasant movement targeted both oppressive local landlords and Vietnamese
representatives ofthe French government, thereby assuming both an anti-imperialist and

Ibid., 56.
Ibid.
27 Ibid.

25

26
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anti-feudal character. Peasant soviets called for the "seizure of communal land
confiscated earlier by wealthy families, the annulment of local taxes, the lowering of
rents, and the distribution of excess rice to the needy.,,28 The issue of rice was
particularly meaningful for the peasants in Nghe-an and Ha-tinh provinces because the
years 1930-1931 were famine years. Excess rice was taken from rich and even middle
peasants to feed the starving. While the redistribution of land was generally restricted to
the aforementioned communal lands that had been confiscated in earlier years by wealthy
families, in some areas famine-stricken peasants "seized the lands of wealthy landowners
on their own initiative;" a few even set up cooperatives,z9
Peasants in Nghe-an and Ha-tinh were responding actively to depressed rural
conditions and real hardship, whether spontaneously in some cases or at the behest of
Communist officials in others. Statistics on landlessness and landownership in the 1930s
offer a devastating general picture of the harsh conditions faced by Vietnamese peasants.
In Annam, where Nghe-an and Ha-tinh ~rovinces are located, roughly 53% of families
were completely landless according to a 1952-1953 study by the French government for
the year 1938. 30 In Tonkin and Cochinchina, roughly 58% and 79% of families
respectively were completely without land. 31
Ofthe persons actually owning land, according to Pierre Gourou's estimates for
Tonkin in 1939,61 % (586,000) of all landowners owned less than one mau32 ; 30%
(283,000) owned from one to five, 6% (60,000) owned from five to ten, 2% (20,000)

Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 38.
Ibid., 38.
30 Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution: Vietnamese Peasants under the French (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1973; reprint 1991), 19.
31 Ibid., 27, 29.
32 A mau ofland was equal to 3,600 square meters (roughly 9/10 of an acre). One hectare was
approximately equal to 2.77 mau.

28

29
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owned from ten to fifty, .0008% (800) owned from fifty to one hundred, and .0002%
(250) owned more than one hundred mau. 33 From these figures, 91 % ofthe population
owned less than five mau while occupying only 37% of the cultivated surface. These
numbers are remarkable in light ofNgo Vinh Long's calculations that a landowner with a
family of four would need at least three mau (1.08 hectares) in order to produce enough
food to feed his family.34 If an overwhelming majority of families that actually owned
land were close to starvation in the 1930s, particularly the famine years of 1930-1931,
imagine what the conditions were like for landless peasants!
The above figures also indicated an extreme concentration of wealth in the hands
of Vietnamese and French landlords. Working from Gourou's statistics, Ngo Vinh Long
claimed that a more accurate estimation ofthe land occupied by large landowners (more
than 50 mau), who made up less than 0.1 % of the total landowning population in Tonkin,
would be close to 17% of the total cultivated surface. The remaining 19% of cultivated
surface was considered communalland.~5 Similar patterns of concentrated landholdings
and poverty existed in Annam and to an even greater extent in Cochin China. 36 It must
be noted that Gourou's figures, as many historians have noticed, likely underestimated
the amount of land owned by landlords and should be treated as rough estimates for

Ibid., 20.
Ibid., 23.
35 Ibid., 21.
36 Long provided the following statistics on landownership in Annam. Small landowners (94% of the total
number oflandholders) owning less than five mau worked on 37% of the cultivated land area. Large
landowners (considerably less than 0.1 % of the population) owning more than 100 mau owned 17% of the
cultivated land area. In Cochinchina, where French domination was the strongest, 80% of all landowners
owned less than five hectares each, a majority in that category owning close to nothing. These small
landowners occupied only 12% of the total cultivated surface. Large landowners (owning more than fifty
hectares) made up 2.5% of the population and occupied 45% of the land. It is important to remember that
out of a rural population of 4,000,000 million in Cochinchina, there were only 255,000 landowners. While
Long's statistics, which come from a combination of Henry's and Gourou's, are at most a rough estimate,
they do illustrate the extreme concentration of wealth in the hands of Vietnamese and French landlords in
the countryside. See Long, Before the Revolution, 27-29.
33

34

17

landownership in the 1930s. Nonetheless, they do present a general, stark portrait of
landownership under the French and give credibility to communist claims that a thorough
land reform and "land to the tiller" program was needed to improve the quality of peasant
life in the countryside.
Statistics on landownership, however, only tell half of the harsh and brutal story
of Vietnamese peasants. In addition to subsistence, which was no easy matter as the
statistics above indicate, peasants also had to pay high land rents, exorbitant interest rates,
and a variety of burdensome taxes to support local elites and the colonial regime. Truong
Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap outlined many of these problems in their piece on rural
conditions, The Peasant Question, 1937-1938. Since most Vietnamese peasants did not
own enough land to support their families, they had to rent out land from landlords and
rich peasants. Truong and Giap indicated the widespread existence of two forms of rent
exploitation, land rent and labor rent. In Tonkin and Annam, landlords charged tenants
50% of the crop for rent in kind. In oth~r areas, tenants received a small plot of land in
exchange for farming the landlords' land. Tenants paying rent with labor would also
have to work as servants in the landlord's house, facing repeated insults and physical
abuse.

37

In addition to the main forms of rent exploitation, peasants also had to deal with

a variety of supplementary rents. Peasants had to pay fees to landlords when they started
farming and when they reported the harvest. In some regions, anytime a landlord
celebrated the anniversary of a family death, peasants would be forced to pay a fee or

37 Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap, The Peasant Question, 1937-1938 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University 1974),32-35 for narrative on rent exploitation. Information on rent exploitation taken from
those pages.
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provide a certain amount of rice. During festival days, peasants had to work without pay
at the landlord's house and in the fields. 38
As Truong and Giap indicated in their report, after the peasant paid all the various
rents and fees, he usually had to borrow money in order to feed and support his family,
especially during "hungry" periods. Ngo Vinh Long stated that since most peasants did
not have anything to mortgage or offer as security, they usually took out short-term loans
at extremely high rates of interest. Long provided the following description of the two
methods of granting short term loans:
According to the first, which is called bac gop ("money collected daily"),
a loan of 10 piasters is reimbursed by a daily installment of 0.40 piasters
over 30 days. At the end ofthis period, the lender has gained 2 piasters,
that is, disregarding calculation of compound interest, an interest rate of
240 percent a year. By the second method, which is called vay bac ngay
or vay cat co ("daily loans" or "cut-throat loans"), a piaster borrowed in
the morning is paid back the same afternoon with a supplement of 0.1 0
piaster: the annual interest is thus 3,650 percent. 39

Peasants able to take out long-term 10aI\s experienced incredibly high interest rates as
well. In Tonkin and Annam, loans taken out over several months ranged from 30-50
percent per rice season, or 60 to 100 percent a year. 40 Peasants, forced to borrow money
because of rent exploitation, found themselves in a repressive cycle of usurious loans and
unending debt.
To make matters worse, peasants also had to pay a variety of direct and indirect
taxes, the most infamous being the head tax. The head tax was a fee that everyone
between 18 and 60 years of age had to pay, 2.25 piasters per person in Tonkin and 3
piasters in Annam. Many peasants had to borrow money from landlords to pay this tax.

38
39
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It is important to remember too that peasants had to pay all production costs, even as a

tenant, including the cost of putting fertilizer in the land. Forced government monopolies
of salt, alcohol, and tobacco also burdened peasants. In many areas, government officials
forced village leaders to buy a certain amount of alcohol, with possible forced-labor
sentences and beatings the result ofnon-compliance. 41
Peasant unrest in the early 1930s, whether spontaneous or instigated by
Communist officials, stemmed from the brutally harsh conditions in the countryside. Not
only did peasants own virtually no land, but they also faced a number of additional
burdens such as rent exploitation and usury that led to a cycle of poverty and rural
indebtedness. All these factors combined to fuel the peasant rebellions of 1930 and the
radical land policies pursued by the ICP.
In the end, however, the French mercilessly crushed the 1930 uprising-with dire
consequences for the ICP. The Party suffered enormous casualties, with total10sses to
the Party estimated at 2,000 dead and

5~000

arrested. Perhaps more importantly for the

newly formed organization, the French decapitated the Party's leadership - up to 90% of
the Party cadres ended up in prison or before a firing squad, according to Communist
sources.

42

For those who remained, a number of valuable lessons were to be learned.

Duiker summed up the lessons nicely:
To transform a rural rebellion into a serious threat to colonial rule would
require an experienced revolutionary Party, disciplined, sure-handed, and
able to tread the thin line behind excessive caution and adventurism. It
would require organization and painstaking preparation in order to build a
broad base of support throughout the countryside. And it would require a
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42 Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 42-43.

40

•
20

firm base among anticolonial elements in the cities. In a word, it would
43
require a full understanding of the protracted character of revolt in Asia.

For an understanding of the "protracted character of revolt in Asia," the Vietnamese
Communists would look increasingly toward Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists
in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Before they could take the time to look for a
revolutionary model; however, they had to rebuild an utterly devastated Communist
Party.

Rebuilding the Party: The Democratic Front

The task of rebuilding the Party after the repression ofthe Nghe-Tinh revolt
received a major boost when the Seventh Comintem Congress called on Communist
parties around the world to unite and form popular fronts with non-communist parties
against the threat of fascism in July 1935. The rise of Hitler in Germany and militarism
\

in Japan had, according to the new analysis, changed the principal enemy of the working
class from imperialism to fascism; hence, the working class should unite with all
progressive forces, including the bourgeoisie, to combat the common threat. Formation
of a French popular front government in 1936 that included that nation's Communist
party allowed the ICP to act and organize openly to an extent previously unseen,
providing rare opportunities for Communist organizing in a colonized country.44 The
release of hundreds of Vietnamese Communist political prisoners, many of whom had
been arrested during the Nghe-Tinh revolt, also aided the organizing efforts of the ICP. 45
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Responding to the change in international conditions, the ICP Central Committee decided
in July 1936 to adopt new policies that differed significantly from the "October Theses."
Temporarily dropping demands of independence and distribution of "land to the tillers,"
the Party advocated
the founding of the broad "Anti-Imperialist People's Front," "embracing
all classes, political parties, and religious organizations, and nationalities
in Indochina, in order to struggle together for elementary democratic
rights: freedom of association, of organization, of speech, of publication,
of movement, and of travel abroad, general amnesty for political prisoners,
eight-hour work day, labour law for workers.... 46
While class struggle was not to be forgotten completely, Ho Chi Minh made it
perfectly clear in his report to the Comintern in July 1939 that working with the popular
front government in France and forming a broad coalition of forces against fascism and
Japanese imperialism was the Party's number one priority. He stated, "For the time
being, the Party should not put forth too exacting demands (national independence,
parliament, ect.). To do so is to play the Japanese fascists' hands. It should only claim
\

democratic rights .... ,,47 The temporary dropping of national independence and the antifeudal task from the program of the revolution led to changes in agrarian policy. The
Party would have had a hard time convincing the French popular front government and
native anti-fascist elements of its sincere commitment to a broad united front ifit were
confiscating French and native landlord possessions at the same time. Instead, the ICP
organized and encouraged peasants to demand reforms within the colonial system, such
as reductions in taxes. As Christine White noted, "Legal forms of peasant organization

Thirty Years ofStruggle ofthe Party (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), (underlining
in text), 50-51. Quotation from document "Around the Indochinese Communist Party's New policy"
published on October 30, 1936, seen in White, "Agrarian Reform," 79.
47 Ho Chi Minh, "The Party's Line in the Period of the Democratic Front (1936-1939) in Selected Writings
1920-1969 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977),42.
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were developed, experience which was useful when the Party was forced underground
again in 1939.,,48
Between 1936 and 1939, the Party was able to extend its influence to urban
workers and intellectuals, as well as rebuild rural party branches that had been destroyed
in 1931. By early 1939, the Party had more than 2,000 members and 40,000 followers.

49

According to William Duiker, when compared to its rivals, the rcP's "performance was
even more impressive." The Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD) and
Constitutionalist Party failed to develop significant followings; the VNQDD was
relatively inactive and the Constitutionalists were in a state of near disintegration. The
result, as Duiker stated in the Communist Road to Power, was that by end of the 1930s,
"the rcp was virtually alone in carrying the banner of Vietnamese nationalism."so
French politics moved increasingly to the right after the collapse of the Popular
Front in 1938 and the creation of the puppet government for the Nazis at Vichy after
Hitler's successful invasion, ending the,era of relatively open activity for the rcp.
Outlawed and harshly repressed once again, the rcp leadership convened the Sixth
Session of the Central Committee in November 1939 to re-evaluate Party policy in light
of the changing international and domestic conditions and France's tightening grip over
its colonial possessions. It stated,
The present situation is dominated by the imperialist war, the economic
crisis, the fascist and colonialist domination, which have caused the
national question to be one of primary urgency and importance. Most of
the small and middle bourgeoisie of the country also hate the imperialists.
On the platform of national liberation and in the supreme interest of the
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nation, all revolutionary tasks, including the agrarian question, must be
made dependent on that aim. 51
In resolutions that would be more fully worked out in the Eight Plenum after the Japanese
invasion in 1940, the Party reaffirmed its commitment to the twin tasks of the revolution
- the anti-imperialist and the anti-feudal- with the national revolution taking priority
over the agrarian. In calling for the formation of a united front of all anticolonial
elements against the French, the subordination of the agrarian question to the needs of the
broad national front, and preparations for armed insurrection, the Sixth Plenum laid out
sketches of the Party's foundation of resistance for the next thirteen years and its
organizational expression: the Vietminh.

The New Democratic Framework

In order to place the founding of the Vietminh and early agrarian policies during
the national united front in proper context, it is important to discuss some aspects of the
\

relationship between the Chinese and Indochinese Communist leadership. 52 The intent in
highlighting Chinese influences is not to imply or even enter the debate over whether Ho
Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communist leadership copied the Chinese revolutionary
model; rather, the intent is to show that the Party was looking to study the larger CCP
framework for revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries for applicability and
practicality in Vietnam.
Many ICP leaders, most notably Ho Chi Minh, had significant relationships and
dealings in China and with the CCP. Ho, after spending nearly half a decade in Moscow,

51
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left the Soviet Union in 1938 to join the CCP in Yenan, though he only spent a few
weeks in the famous CCP headquarters.53 Traveling with Ye Jianying, later the Secretary
of Defense and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
in Beijing, Ho went to Chunking where he, according to King Chen in Vietnam and

China, 1938-1954, "frequently visited Chou En-lai." Ho later went on to serve as "the
club manager of a liaison office of the Eighth Route Army in Kweilin and concurrently as
a radio operator." 54 From Kweilin, Ho continued his travels south to Kunming, capital
of Yunnan Province and a refuge for Vietnamese revolutionaries fleeing the intense
French persecution after 1939. "With the area now in a highly fluid state as a result of
the Japanese invasion along the southern Chinese coast," according to Duiker, "the
southern provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi presented a relatively secure haven for
Vietnamese nationalists and a potential base for political activities in Vietnam.,,55 It was
in Kunming that Ho met up with his future comrade-in-arms Pham Van Dong and Vo
Nguyen Giap, who had been sent by th~ ICP Central Committee to China to find him.

56

Interestingly, upon their arrival in Kunming, Ho Chi Minh sent Dong and Giap to
the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Yenan to "solidify links with the CCP and to
strengthen his colleagues' understanding ofthe Maoist concept of people's war.,,57 For
Pham Van Dong, the future representative ofthe DRV delegation at Geneva, the trip to
China was not his first; he had gone to South China in the 1920s to join Ho' s
52 Two books in particular chronicle the relationship between the Vietnamese and Chinese Communists,
King Chen's, Vietnam and China 1938-1954 (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) and Qiang
Zhai's, China and the Vietnam Wars 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
53 Not much is known about Ho's activities during his stay in Yenan. While Ho did mention his
experiences in the Eighth Route Army in his piece, "The Chinese Revolution and the Vietnamese
Revolution," July 1, 1961) Selected Writings, he did not mention anything about Yenan.
54 King Chen, Vietnam and China: 1938-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969),43.
55 Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 69.
56 Ibid., 69. Incident also referenced by King Chen, Vietnam and China, 4041.
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Revolutionary Youth League and study at the famous Whampoa Military Academy.
While Dong and Giap never made it to Yenan (Ho cancelled the trip two weeks later,
after the Germans conquered Paris), Ho's decision to send the two leaders reflected a
shift in strategic orientation away from Moscow to the experiences of the CCP in the War
of Resistance to Japan. Yet, the move also seemed to suggest a deeper understanding that
the basic tenets of the CCP program for revolution in colonial and semi-colonial
countries could be applied to Vietnam, providing the necessary meta-framework for the
revolution. This understanding could be seen prominently in the ICP's founding of the
Vietminh Front in May 1941.
The Eighth Plenum of the ICP, which met in May 1941, formalized the new Party
strategy promulgated by the Central Committee in November 1939. With the invasion of
the Japanese in September 1940, the Vietnamese people faced an additional imperialist
enemy. The Eighth Plenum witnessed the official creation of a broad national united
front - known as the Vietminh - of alll\atriotic elements, including landlords and
members of the bourgeoisie, under the leadership of the proletariat for national liberation
from the "double yoke" of French and Japanese imperialism. Appealing to the
nationalistic impulses of all social strata in a June 6 public letter entitled, "The Founding
of the Vietminh," Ho Chi Minh proclaimed, "Rich people, soldiers, workers, peasants,
intellectuals, employees, traders, youth, and women who warmly love your country! At
present time national liberation is the most important problem. Let us unite together!"S8
The establishment of a national united front against imperialism was a major part
ofthe new-democratic framework. Mao's January 1940 treatise, "On New Democracy,"
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written just one year before the founding of the Vietminh, laid out the theory and reasons
for a national united front within the two-stage revolution in semi-colonial and colonial
countries. He stated,
Since China is a colony as well as a semi-colony encroached upon by
others, her national bourgeoisie has at certain periods and to a certain
degree a revolutionary quality. Here the task of the proletariat is to attach
due importance to the revolutionary quality of the national bourgeoisie and
establish with it a united front against imperialism and the governments of
bureaucrats and warlords. 59
Yet, at the same time, Mao warned of the tenuous nature of alliances with the national
bourgeoisie and landlord class:
But at the same time, just because the Chinese national bourgeoisie
is a bourgeois class in a colony and semi-colony, it is extremely flabby
politically and economically and possesses another character, namely a
proneness to compromise with the enemy of the revolution. Even when it
takes part in a revolution, it is unwilling to break completely with
imperialism and is moreover closely related to exploitation by land rent in
rural areas; thus it is neither willing nor able to overthrow imperialism
thoroughly, much less the feudal forces. So neither of the two basic
problems, or the two basic tasks, of China's bourgeois-democratic
revolution can be solved or accomplished by the Chinese national
bourgeoisie. 6o

58 Ho Chi Minh, "Founding of the Doc-Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietminh)," in Vietnam and America,
Gettleman et aI., ed., 23-24.
59 Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," vol. 3, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1954),
117. The national bourgeoisie, for Mao, represented the middle bourgeoisie and the capitalist relations of
production. Unlike the comprador class, which depended on imperialism and foreign capital for its
livelihood, the national bourgeoisie, in the words of Mao,

feel[s] the need for revolution and favour[s] the revolutionary movement against
imperialism and the warlords when they are smarting under the blows of foreign capital
and the oppression of the warlords, but they become suspicious of the revolution when
they sense that, with the militant participation of the proletariat at home and the active
support of the international proletariat abroad, the revolution is threatening the hope of
their class to attain the status of a big bourgeoisie.
Mao Zedong, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," in Selected Works, vol. 1 (peking: Foreign
Languages Press, 1975), 14.
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With the bourgeoisie unable to complete and provide leadership to the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution because of divisions wrought by imperialism, the leadership of the
revolution would fall to the proletariat and its political organ, the Communist Party.
Imperialism placed an additional burden on workers and peasants already
suffering under the yoke of feudal oppression, causing the worker-peasant alliance to
serve as the most enthusiastic and revolutionary force. The first stage of the revolution
(bourgeois-democratic), therefore, would not result in the establishment of a capitalist
society under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, but rather the establishment of a newdemocratic republic under the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes led by the
proletariat. 61 With leadership of the revolution in the hands of the proletariat and with the
worker-peasant alliance the driving force, "new democracy" would serve as a
"transitional step toward socialism." Mao stated,
Thus this revolution actually serves the purpose of creating a still wider
path for the development of socialism.... Such a revolution inevitably
becomes a part of the pr~letarian-socialist world revolution. 62
"On New Democracy" brought Mao's political treatises on guerilla warfare,
contradiction, class relationships, protracted struggle, the united front, the relationship
between the Party and the people, and the relationship between political and military
struggle together on a grand scale to form a usable programme for national liberation and
eventual socialist revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries. Liu Shaoqi, one of
the CCP's top leaders next to Mao, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai, mentioned the broader
applicability of "new democracy" to Southeast Asia specifically in a 1946 interview with
Anna Louise Strong in Yenan. He stated that new democracy "charts a way not only for
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the Chinese people but for the billion folk who live in the colonial countries of southeast
Asia.,,63 He also stressed the applicability of "new democracy" at the Asian and
Australian Trade Unions Conference in Peking in November-December 1949. Giving the
keynote address, Liu stated,
The road that the Chinese people have followed in winning their
victories over imperialism and its lackeys and founding the Chinese
People's Republic is the road that the peoples of many colonial and semi
colonial areas should traverse in their struggle for national independence
and people's democracy.64
Liu then laid out the four-point "formula" that brought success to the Chinese Revolution
based upon the framework of "new democracy" and the CCP's experiences in War of
Resistance to Japan and the ensuing civil war with KMT. The formula included: (1) the
formation of a broad national united front of anti-imperialist classes; (2) working class
leadership of the united front in the form of the Communist Party; (3) a Communist Party
that has a resolute understanding of Marxist-Leninist tenets, strategy and tactics, selfcriticism, strict discipline, and the imp('irtance of close ties to the masses; and (4) the
formation of a Communist-led national liberation army.65
Luu Duc Pho, the Vietminh's chief delegate at the conference, replied:
In Asia, the decisive victory won by the Chinese people and the
Chinese working class is, we shall say, a fatal strike to the imperialists....
In the nations in Southeast Asia, the imperialists are still planning to
strengthen their military bases, their forces are still strong; the path of the
475 millions of Chinese people is the path to be taken to win a decisive
victory over the imperialists.

Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," in the Selected Works ofMao Zedong, Vol. 2 (Peking: Foreign
Languages Press, 1975),347. For more detail on the politics of "new democracy," see pages 348-353.
62 Ibid., 343-344.
63 Chen, Vietnam and China, 216.
64 Liu Shao-Ch'i, Collected Works ofLiu Shao-ch 'i 1945-1957 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute,
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The essential principles ...defined by Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i in his
opening speech...must serve as the compass for all the workers of
Southeast Asia. 66

It must be noted that Luu Duc Pho' s statement above came at a conference in China that
occurred just a month after the founding of the People's Republic, and hence could have

flowing into Vietnam. Yet, many Vietnamese leaders explicitly mentioned the newdemocratic character of the Vietnamese Revolution in contexts outside practical, military
considerations. Party theoretician Truong Chinh frequently mentioned the newdemocratic character of the revolution in Party theoretical writings. In his collection of

Su That articles published to commemorate theVietminh's later seizure of power in the
August Revolution of 1945, he stated: "It is clear that the August Revolution has
established a democratic republican regime with the character of a people's democracy, a
new democracy in Viet Nam.,,67 Reiterating the new-democratic orientation in his
landmark piece, "The Resistance Will 'Yin," published in 1947, two years after the
August Revolution, Truong affirmed:
Though the August Revolution set up the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, this regime is not yet perfect. The present war of resistance will
extend and consolidate the democratic republic regime of Viet Nam and
develop it on the basis of new democracy....
This resistance carries on the work of the August Revolution. It is
a revolutionary war aimed at achieving national independence, democracy,
and freedom. A new Viet Nam is being forged in the fire ofthe resistance:
an independent, unified, democratic, prosperous Viet Nam - a new
democratic Viet Nam. 68
Truong indicated in this piece that the Vietnamese Revolution was going to develop on
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the basis of "new democracy" and the experiences of the Resistance War, just as the CCP
developed along the basis of "new democracy" and the experiences of the War of
Resistance to Japan. He also recognized the transitional nature of "new democracy"
when he indicated that the Vietnamese Revolution must complete the task of national
democratic revolution to pave the way for the "socialist revolution in the future. ,,69 It is
important to note that even Ho Chi Minh characterized the Vietnamese revolution as
new-democratic, though he put a more nationalistic emphasis on it when he stated in
1949, "Chinese New Democracy is Chinese, ours is Vietnamese" in 1949. 70 The
combination ofPho's statement, the Vietminh's study China campaign, Ho Chi Minh's
sending of Giap and Dong to Yenan, and Truong Chinh's and Ho's characterization of
the Vietnamese Revolution as new-democratic all indicated that the Communist
leadership looked to apply the larger CCP framework for revolution in colonial and semi
colonial countries to accomplish the revolution's two principal tasks, the anti-imperialist
and the anti-feudal.

\

Agrarian Policies Before the August Revolution

Stemming from the new-democratic framework, the Chinese and Vietnamese
Communists shared a class analysis in the early 1940s that recognized a potential
revolutionary quality in the national bourgeoisie. The class analysis provided by the ICP
during the Eighth Plenum, particularly the policy of differentiation between elements in
the national bourgeoisie and landlord class, closely resembled Mao's analysis of Chinese
classes in the War of Resistance Against Japan. For the Vietnamese Communists, the
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official creation and advocacy of a national united front of all anti-colonial elements in
May 1941 was the result ofthe Party's analysis of changing class relations resulting from
the onset of World War II and the Japanese invasion of Vietnam. In a resolution issued at
the close of the Eighth Plenum, the Party stated,
[T]he landlords, rich peasants, and native bourgeois class have greatly
changed their attitude. Before they had an antipathy to revolution and
wanted to destroy it or were indifferent. Now it is different, and with the
exception of a few running dogs who flatter and fawn on the Japanese
enemy, the majority have sympathy for the revolution or are neutraL ... If
before the landlords and native bourgeoisie were the reserve army of the
antirevolutionary imperialists, they have now become the reserve of the
revolution. 71
Truong Chinh provided a more nuanced analysis of the landlord class in a September
1941 study document called, "The Party's New Policy:"
The feudal landowning class and the comprador bourgeois stratum are
clearly divided. One landowner and compradore bourgeois embraces the
French fascists; another would like to change masters, and follows the
Japanese fascists. However, a few landowners, mostly small landowners,
have lost faith in the French imperialists and also suspect the policy of
Japan, so they have a sympathetic neutral attitude toward the revolution. 72
While the two differ in their enthusiasm for potential alliances with bourgeois and
landlord elements, they do share a basic analysis of the potential for a multi-class alliance
against imperialism. This analysis would be the foundation from which agrarian policies
during the Vietminh era would originate.
The national united front in both countries attempted to reach out to the patriotic,
anti-colonial elements in the bourgeoisie and landlord class, and as a result, both nations
implemented moderate agrarian policies in the interests of preserving class unity in the
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national united front. For the CCP, Mao made this policy clear in his May 1937 piece,
"The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan," when
he pledged to discontinue the confiscation ofthe land oflandlords "for the sake of
internal peace, democracy and armed resistance and for the sake of establishing the antiJapanese national united front." 73 For only then, Mao argued, could the Party ''transform
the state of antagonism between the two different regimes within the country and achieve
unity for common action against the enemy, in line with the changes in the relative
political importance of China's external and internal contradictions.,,74 While the
Vietminh did not have a formidable domestic enemy like Chiang Kai-shek and the
Kuomintang during Wodd War II, it did want to transform the state of antagonism
between the wealthy propertied classes and the communist-led resistance to achieve unity
against French and Japanese imperialism.
For the ICP, the Eighth Plenum marked the official pronouncement of the national
united front, the subordination ofthe ~i-feudal task to the interests of the national
revolution, and the necessity of implementing moderate agrarian policies. In, "The
Party's New Policy," Truong Chinh stated,
[I]n the present conditions ofthe Indochinese revolution we cannot yet
confiscate the land of the native landowners and redistribute it to the
peasants (except for the land belonging to the Vietnamese traitors).
Because if we do that, we cannot divide the landowning class, cannot win
over or at least neutralize the small landowners, especially the
intellectuals, students who are children of the landowners, and we will
unintentionally deprive ourselves of our support, and increase the enemy's
reserve forces.
However, the Indochinese peasants are not separate from the
revolution either. We do not forget that ninety percent of the Indochinese
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people are peasants. If the peasant class does not participate in the
revolution the national liberation revolution cannot succeed. 75
For the Party, the balance between the interests of peasants and those of the united front
led to a moderate policy of redistributing land belonging to "Japanese-French
imperialists" and reducing rents and debts. The leaders of the Vietminh prescribed a
policy of moderation because they believed unity with progressive landlords and
bourgeois elements would provide the most effective resistance to their main enemy,
French and Japanese imperialism. 76 The anti-feudal task, therefore, had to be
subordinated to national liberation and the interests of the national united front, and the
Party showed its commitment to this beliefthrough its confiscation oflands only
belonging to French and Vietnamese traitors (progressive landlords left untouched) and
its policy ofrent reduction. The Eighth Plenum did, however, explicitly recognize the
necessity of moderate land policies as a base for the future land reform and
implementation of the slogan "land to the tiller." 77
\

Truong Chinh, "The Party's New Policy," 5.
The language of the sentence comes from a sentence in Thomas Lutze, "China's New Democratic
Revolution: Complexities of the 'Anti-Feudal Struggle, 1945-1949," Journal of the Southwest Conference
on Asian Studies 3 (2001): 108. Referring to the CCP's moderate land policies during the war of resistance
to Japan, Lutze stated,
75

76

The anti-Japanese united front of 1937-1945...prescribed a policy of moderation toward
landlords in a national struggle for survival. Hence, during the War of Resistance, the
CCP carried out a policy of "double reduction" of rent and of interest, rather than land
confiscation, to encourage the formation of a multi-class front against the main enemy,
Japanese imperialism, and to lessen landlord resistance to mobilization of peasants for the
war.
77 Ibid., 6. Mao also explicitly mentioned the slogan of "land to the tillers," which originated with Sun Yat
sen, in "On New Democracy." He stated,

This republic will adopt certain necessary measures to confiscate the land of landlords
and distribute it to those peasants having no land or only a little land, carry out Dr. Sun
Yat-sen's slogan of "land to the tillers," abolish the feudal relations in the rural areas, and
tum the land into the private property of peasants....The correct slogan for this line is
"land to the tillers.
Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," 122.
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The balance between the interests of peasants and the national united front,
however, would not always tip in favor of the united front. Different overarching
contexts for the revolution between 1951 and 1954 would lead to the implementation of a
more radical land reform and the tipping of the scale in favor of peasants. Responding to
increased U.S. military intervention and the rise ofa domestic competitor after the
Second Party Congress in 1951, the Party recognized that it was not fully mobilizing the
vast resources and military potential ofthe peasantry for the resistance out of concerns
for preserving unity. It was determined then that the benefits of land reform in terms of
mobilizing and winning the long-term support of peasants would more than outweigh the
costs of alienating landlords and other bourgeois elements, particularly since peasants
proved to be the most enthusiastic, dependable, and staunch supporters ofthe revolution.
It is important to recognize the overarching contexts for agrarian policies during the years

of the Vietminh in order to understand the reasons why the Party would ultimately
\

undertake a more radical land reform in 1953 and compromise at Geneva.

The August Revolution

The policies, strategy, and ideology adopted by the ICP in 1941 paid off in a big
way when the Viet Minh Insurrection Committee issued an order calling for the armed
forces and people to attack and take over urban areas and enemy strongholds in a general
insurrection on August 13, 1945. 78 As the historian Ngo Vinh Long noted, "Within a
period of only twelve days, from 14-25 August, fifty-nine provinces were completely
liberated, ending almost a century of colonial domination and hundreds of years of
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monarchial rule.,,79 With the abdication of the emperor Bao Dai, the government was
finally in the hands of the Vietnamese people and the Viet Minh.
"French and Japanese rich requisitioning and the terrible famine of 1944-45 in
North Vietnam," Christine White indicated in Agrarian Reform and National Liberation,
"formed the context in which the Viet Minh was able to spread its influence rapidly in the
lowland areas of the Tonkin delta on the basis of united front opposition to French and
Japanese policies." One ofthe most effective organizing tools for the Party was the
"paddy seizure movement," in which it organized peasants to storm and confiscate
Japanese rice-stocks. Estimates of the number of dead in the 1944-1945 famine reach
upwards of two million, or 20% of the population of Tonkin. 8o Historians of the
revolution even note the presence of corpses lying along roadsides.

81

Yet, "the famine

had long-range social effects since it did not affect all sectors of the population equally.
While it did not spare some of the better-off inhabitants of the countryside, it was
primarily the poor who died.,,82 The foVowing eyewitness accounts of the famine and the
contrasting experience of the rich and poor illustrate this point:
People who could buy things to eat threw the wrapping leaves, the banana
peels, and the corncobs all over the walkways. The hungry would pick up
the leaves and the peels to lick and chew on them...
The customers in the wine shop talked about the New Year market and
about the starvation. To season their tales, they drank several cups of
wine apiece to go with their ham, boiled chicken, roast pork, or hot bowls
of noodle soup. As the wine went in, the words came out. They
conversed in deep measured tones and laughed happily. Meanwhile, the
hungry, who had risked their lives robbing food in the market, were being
dragged back to this same area and were there tied up with their arms
Ngo Vinh Long, "Vietnam's Revolutionary Tradition," in Vietnam and America, Gettleman et aI., ed., 17.
Ibid.
80 Both White, "Agrarian Reform," 103, and Duiker, Communist Road, 86, cited the number of dead at
approximatley two million.
81 Duiker, Communist Road, 86.
82 White, "Agrarian Reform," 104.
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twisted behind them around the pillars ofthe shop. Now and then a
customer would stand up and point a finger at them, yelling insults; "The
best thing to do would be have you bums beaten to death."
That same morning the whole market was abuzz with the news that the
village council chairman's eldest son had ordered the chief of the village
patrolmen to sever the leg tendons of a certain boy named Lieu because he
had dared to pick his pocket. 83
Looking at the famine in light of the later land reform, White concluded that
only a scant decade later the vivid memory of such acts of cruelty and
indifference to the suffering of the starving became an important factor
when poor and landless peasants became the most powerful class in the
countryside during the mass mobilization for land reform .... Landlords
were called to answer for their acts of during the famine period, with the
rural poor sitting as their judges. 84

For the purposes of this study, it is important to recognize that the Party
leadership also did notforget the devastating effects of the famine on poor and landless
peasants, who were the most enthusiastic supporters of the revolution and the majority of
the people's armed forces. Under the heading, "Why Do We Have to Carry out Land
\

Reform During the War of Resistance," in his report about the proposed radical land
reform policy to the First National Conference of the Vietnam Workers' Party
(November 1953), Truong Chinh mentioned the terrible human costs of the famine. He
stated,
At the end of 1944 and early in 1945, two million of our peasants died of
starvation not only due to savage exploitation by the feudal landlord class,
but also because the Japanese fascists and the French imperialists brutally
robbed them of their resources. 85

Ibid., 104-105.
Ibid., 105.
85 Truong Chinh, "Implementing the Land Refonn," (Report delivered at the First National Conference of
the Vietnam Workers' Party, November 14-23, 1953) in Selected Writings, 445.
83
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Resolutions adopted at the National Conference of the Party from August 13-15
just prior to the general insurrection represented continuity with the policies enumerated
at the Eighth Plenum and emphasized the need to carry out the ''ten-point Viet Minh
policy." In terms of agrarian reform, resolutions indicated the Party's need to "confiscate
the property of the invaders and the traitors, nationalize it and distribute it to the poor
according to the case;" to "abolish the iniquitous system of taxation established by the
imperialists and set up an equitable and rational taxation system;" to "re-allot communal
land so that the poor peasants will have land to till;" and to "reduce land rent and interest
and defer payment of10ans.,,86 Such agrarian policies were consistent with the
moderation of the national united front and the multi-class effort at seizing power from
the Japanese.
When the Vietminh came to power in August 1945, they immediately issued a
circular for a 25% reduction in land rents,8? the cancellation of all secondary rents, and
the cancellation of all arrears in rent o~ed by tenants before August 1945, in addition to
the continued policy of redistributing communa11and and land owned by French and
Vietnamese traitors. 88 Yet again, there were other overarching contexts that impacted the
ability of the recently created DRV to carry out agrarian reforms, particularly the fragile
situation of the new republic in the international scene and the prospect of another
devastating famine. The dual entry of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops in the North
and of British troops south of the 16th parallel to disarm the Japanese, two forces
"Resolution of the National Conference of the Indochinese Communist Party," in Gareth Porter,
Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation, 58.
87 Christine White pointed out that since rent had been about 50% of the crop, the Vietminh rent reduction
brought rent down to 37.5% of the crop, the same as the KMT rent ceiling applied by the CCP during the
War of Resistance to Japan. White, "Land Refonn in North Vietnam,"(Agency for Intematonal
Development, June 1970),24.
86
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extremely hostile to the possibility of Vietminh rule, provided an ominous context for the
beginnings of self-government in Vietnam. "In defiance of the agreement at Potsdam to
avoid intervention in the local political situation," the British "disarmed the Vietminh and
other nationalist groups and turned power over to the French, whose military units began
to arrive in October.,,89 For the Party leadership, the very survival of the regime from
hostile Allied powers was at stake after the August Revolution.
Furthermore, the threat of famine remained serious, as the 1945 harvest was half
the normal tonnage. Northern Vietnam also flooded, submerging 80% of the Tonkin
delta in water and destroying 300,000 tons of rice. 90 As a result, a major cholera
epidemic ensued, then drought followed, with DRV experts predicting that food would
run out by February 1946. 91 Increasing agricultural production to avoid another famine
and human disaster was a major concern. The Party was also limited in its ability to carry
out a more radical land policy because of its pure numbers; there were only 5,000
members of the rcp at the time of the .t\ugust Revolution. 92 Agrarian revolution was not
a top priority when issues of survival, both as a government and as a people, dominated
the Party agenda. As the land reform historian Edwin Moise stated, though, the circular
for rent reduction also "had little practical effect, because the government did not
mobilize the peasants to force the landlords to obey.,,93 Christine White noted that the re
distribution of communal land was the most widespread reform; the Party did not stress
the confiscation of French and Vietnamese traitor lands or the new rent reduction

88 Edwin Moise, Land Refonn in China and North Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1983), 155.
89 Duiker, Vietnam: Revolution in Transition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995),47.
90 White, "Agrarian Refonn," 114.
91 Duiker, Communist Road, 112.
92 White, "Agrarian Refonn," 119.
93 Ibid.
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circular. "In its infancy," White claimed, "the DRV government concentrated on
mobilizing the resources of the existing Vietnamese social system for the national
cause.,,94
While not enforcing rent reduction or the confiscation of "traitor" lands in the
months after the August Revolution, the Party was able to stop famine conditions
lingering from World War II; wipe out the hated opium, salt, and alcohol monopolies;
end the head tax and some of the supplementary land taxes that were a huge burden on
small landowners and tenant farmers; and drastically improve literacy in just a few
years. 95 Despite these improvements, though, the Party did not fundamentally alter
patterns oflandownership in the countryside, nor did it satisfy peasant demands for land.
At this point, it is necessary to take a look at landownership in North Vietnam
during the year 1945. It will provide a basis for evaluating the Party agrarian policies
that followed during the war with France that lasted from 1946-1954. The statistics on
landownership below for 1945 have be~n taken from Edwin Moise's, Land Reform in

China and North Vietnam, one of the most careful studies of Vietnamese land reform.
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White, "Agrarian Reform," 114.
Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968),233.
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Table I: The Land Tenure Situation in 1945 in the 3,653 xa of North Vietnam that
underwent land refonn between 1953 and 1956.
**

Population

Land Owned

(%)

(%)

Colonialists

1

Churches

1.5

Landlords

3.2

24.5

Rich
peasants*
Middle
peasants
Poor
Peasants and
Agricultural
Laborers
Communal
and
semipublic

*2.2

7.1

31

29

58.9

11.1

96

25

\

• The percentage for rich peasants was taken from a table on the previous page of land owned by different
classes before August 1945. The number, while not 100% accurate, is probably a close figure. All figures,
according to Moise, should be viewed as approximations.
.. Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap broadly defined rural classes in The Peasant Question, 1937-1938.
Up until the Land Reform Law, the Party used their definitions. For the purposes of this study, it will not
be important to discuss the specific definitions and revisions of class demarcation in the Land Reform Law
but rather the defmitions provided by Giap and Truong. They defined rural classes as follows: landless
peasants - "peasants with no land, draft animals, or farm implements at all. Throughout the year they must
work for the landlord and the rich peasant; they are mercilessly exploited and extremely poor;" poor
peasants - "peasants with a little land, but not enough to support themselves, so they must work for wages
or as tenants for rich families. Peasants in this catergory farm for themselves to some extent but mainly
work for others;" middle peasants - "average peasants who have enough farmland to support themselves.
They do not rent land, and, generally speaking, do not hire laborers;" rich peasants - ''peasants with more
than enough land. They and their family farm one part; the remainder, which they cannot farm themselves,
is farmed by hired laborers or tenants. Thus the rich peasant exploits the labor power of agricultural
laborers;" landlords - "They rent their land to tenants, sit idly and collect profits, and never touch a plow.
They make a living entirely by exploiting the labor power of the peasants." Truong and Giap, The Peasant
Question, 16-17.
96 Tran Phuong, ed. Cach mang ruong dat 0 Viet-nam [The Land Revolution in Vietnam] (Hanoi: Nha xuat
ban khoa hoc xa hoi, 1968), 14, in Edwin Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating
the Revolution and the Village Level (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 151.
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As Moise's statistics illustrate, landownership was still extremely concentrated in
1945, with poor peasants and laborers comprising roughly 60% of the population but
owning roughly 11 % of the land. Landlords, while comprising only 3.2% of the
population, owned some 25% of the land. Truong Chinh was right when he stated in Su
That articles in 1946 that the August Revolution had not "abolished all the vestiges of

feudalism in Viet Nam, nor realized agrarian reform and given land to the tillers.',97 The
Party's commitment to moderation and the national united front could be seen in its
reaction to demands from poor peasants for land redistribution in some parts of Vietnam
just after the August Revolution. As Duiker noted, in northern Annam and in the
province of Quang Ngai, "poor peasants agitated for an immediate redistribution of land."
In many rural areas, the Party's moderate policies were ignored, and local cadres
confiscated property and divided land. The Central Committee issued a directive in
November reminding Party cadres that at this point in the Vietnamese Revolution, the
anti-feudal task had to be subordinated,to the interests of national liberation. 98

Agrarian Policies during the Early Years of the War of Resistance, 1946-1951

The renewal of the Resistance War in 1946 after the return of the French dashed
any hopes for a change in policy to emphasize the agrarian question and launch an
immediate "land to the tiller" campaign. The Vietnamese land reform historian Tran
Phuong, while criticizing the Party for not placing enough emphasis on the agrarian
question, also mentioned some of the overarching contexts for agrarian policies in 1946:

97

98

Truong Chinh, "The August Revolution," 47.
Duiker, Communist Road, 114.
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In December 1946, at the very time when the struggle of the
peasants was gaining force, the nation-wide Resistance war broke out.
During the first years of the war, the carrying out of the agrarian policy
was somewhat neglected, for a number ofreasons: the conduct of a long
term Resistance required the mobilization and concentration of all the
national forces; the military situation became more pressing and more
complicated; but also the anti-feudal task ofthe Revolution was under
estimated. 99

Immediate survival needs of the revolution against the intense French onslaught once
again trumped the agrarian question and placed the anti-feudal task on the Party
backburner. While unable to focus on the agrarian question during the DRV's fragile
first months and then during the renewal of the Resistance War, the Party should have
been able to place more of an emphasis on it after weathering the French "lightning war"
attack on the Viet Bac stronghold in winter 1947. By 1948, the amount of territory under
Vietminh control expanded significantly; approximately 55% of all villages throughout
the country were under Vietminh contro1. lOO
In his 1947 tract, "The Resistance Will Win," Truong Chinh denounced cadres
\

who believed land should be taken from all landlords and distributed to peasants.
Emphasizing the need to differentiate among feudalists in the interests of the national
united front, he stated,
There are some friends who think that since our present struggle
has a national and democratic character at the same time as we are fighting
the colonialists, then this entails land being taken away from landlords and
distributed to the tillers. We reply: this war of resistance is fulfilling the
task of national liberation and is developing new democracy. At present,
we shall limit ourselves to the confiscation ofland and other property
belonging to Vietnamese traitors in order to distribute this land to the
peasants on the one hand, and swell the budget of the resistance on the
other. This does not mean that we shall carry out absolutely no land
reform during the course of the war of resistance. But it must be
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Tran Phuong, "The Land Reform," 170.
Duiker, Communist Road, 142.
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implemented gradually and undertaken step by step, in such a way as to
differentiate among the feudalists, and isolate the French colonialist
aggressors. 101
Integral to the step-by-step approach for land reform was rent reduction and many of the
partial reforms outlined by the Party after the August Revolution. Yet such piecemeal
reforms were not being carried out and implemented at the village level, even after the
Vietminh began to recoup in the years 1948-1950 after the French onslaught. In an
October 1948 Su That article, Truong Chinh listed a number of reasons why calls for rent
reduction were being ignored. While the entry of the Chinese, British, and French shortly
after World War II provided an overarching international context for agrarian policies in
the late 1940s, Chinh focused on some of the domestic contexts for the failure to
thoroughly implement the Party's rent reduction policy in the years after the August
Revolution. As White has summarized the article, he indicated that "peasants did not
know their rights in order to demand the decrease, and the landlords and local
government committees, which included landlords, just ignored the policy." Most
importantly, the situation had to be rectified with a law because peasants could not be
expected to make endless sacrifices without getting anything in return - in the short-term,
reductions in rent; in the long-term, land. 102 Truong ended with a desperate appeal to
landlords to implement the Party's rent reduction policy: "Respected sirs, I beg you to
remember: peasants are the greatest force in the Resistance. If they do not participate
enthusiastically in the Resistance, the country will be IOSt.,,103

Truong Chinh, "The Resistance Will Win," 99.
White, "Agrarian Refonn," 126-27.
103 Truong Chinh, "Giam dia to" (Reduce rents) Su That No. 101 (October 15,1948), quoted in White,
"Agrarian Refonn," 127.
101
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The Second Plenum of the Central Committee in January 1948 outlined the
Party's agrarian policies, which were a reiteration of the policies adopted after the August
Revolution. The Plenum once again called on the Party to
1.

Thoroughly implement the 25 percent rent reduction (not done
in many areas).

2.

Abolish secondary rents ....

3.

Abolish the system of subletting land.

4.

Temporarily allocate the land and property of traitors to the
poor cultivators, or give it to military units to cultivate so they
can be to some extent self-supporting.

5.

Redistribute communal land more rationally and justly.

6.

Allocate the land of the enemy to the poor cultivators....

11.

Fix the wages of [agricultural] laborers (by the day and by the
season); protect the landowners against losses.

12.

The rent of estates whose owners have long been absent, or who
live in enemy-occupied territory, shall temporarily be given to
the provincial resistance administrative committee.... (The
\

government promises to return these rents to the landowner
whenever he returns and is judged entitled to receive these
rents.) 104
The fact that the same agrarian reforms kept appearing in the Party program in the years
after the August Revolution and that the Party recognized its lack of implementation
officially in the Second Plenum indicated the extent to which the modest policies of rent
and tax reduction were being ignored at the local level.
Momentum from the Second Plenum and the Fifth Cadres' Conference in August
1948 likely led to the decision to issue a decree and formal law about rent reduction in
1949. In July, the Party issued Decree 78 of 14 July 1949, repeating the old demand that
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rents should be reduced 25% below the level of 1945. "It is indicative of the caution of
Vietminh agrarian policy," Christine White stated, ''that due to the priorities of
production and the united front, the problem of usurious loans, as great a burden on the
peasantry as rents, was not dealt with until May 1950.,,105
At this point, it is important to refer to Moise's statistics on landownership to see
the empirical results of the effects ofVietminh agrarian policies between August 1945
and decree 78 for rent reduction in July 1949. While reforms and the distribution of
French and Vietnamese traitor lands after the August Revolution did have a significant
impact on improving peasant lives, they still did not fundamentally change the
concentration oflandownership and the bases of feudalism in the countryside. Table-2
shows the amounts of land transferred from various sources to peasants between 1945
and 1949.

\

104
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Moise, Land Reform, 156.
White, "Land Reform in North Vietnam," 25.
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Table-2 - Transfers ofland from French, landlord, communal, and institutional
ownership in 3,035 xa 106 of North Vietnam, which underwent land reform between 1953
and 1956. 107

Original Ownership

August 1945 to
July 1949

French

11,656

% Transferred
to Peasants
61

Landlords: total

25,522

10

---traitors (confiscated)

8,281

34

Hectares

*

*

Communal and semipublic 76,127

32

Catholic Church

Total

113,306

*The combined total of land
transferred from the Catholic
Church between 1945 and the
beginning of land refonn was
7,472 hectares, roughly 48%.

22

Thus, by 1949, the Party confiscated over 60% of French landholdings, they still
maintained 39% of their original holdings from 1945, the rough equivalent of the number
of hectares confiscated from native landlord traitors. Native landlords went virtually
untouched during the years 1945-1949, maintaining control over roughly 90% of their
landholdings from August 1945. It should be noted that of the 10% confiscated from
native landlords, roughly a third of that land came from traitors or collaborators with the
French.
In short, Agrarian policies from 1945-1949 did not break up concentrated
landownership and the basis of feudalism in the countryside, nor did it effectively
106 According to Moise, the main administrative levels below three regions of Tonkin, Annaro, and
Cochinchina were the province, the huyen (district, equivalent to the Chinese xian), and the xa
(administrative village, equivalent to the Chinese xiang). Moise, Land Reform, 147.
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mobilize the vast resources of the peasantry for the resistance and the Party. According
to a later account by Truong Chinh and articles written in the Party newspaper Su That in
1950, landlords were able to dominate united front organizations set up at the village
level, inhibiting efforts to implement the various reforms, land seizures, and calls for rent
reduction. 108 As a result, poor peasants dragged their feet and refused to put their hearts
into the resistance; the failure to adequately meet their main demand-for land-despite
their enormous sacrifices during World War II and the War of Resistance against France
took its toll on their morale. 109 Even the reductions of rent had been widely ignored
before the formal decree of July 1949. The dramatic expansion of the Party from 50,000
members in 1947 to 150,000 in 1948 apparently was not accompanied by a dramatic
expansion in peasant organization. 110 In 1948, only 820,000 peasants were enrolled in
the Vietminh's peasant associations, an amazing number in light of the several millions
of peasants residing in the areas that would later make up North Vietnam. 111
Dissatisfaction over the slow pace of social
change in villages was also growing within
\
the army and in Vietminh controlled rural areas. As Christine White noted, "Soldiers
from poor families resented the fact that, while they were off fighting, their families, even
in Viet Minh controlled areas, were still paying taxes to or working for landlords, and

Tran Phuong, Cach mang ruong dat, table following page 70, in Moise, Land Reform, 164-165.
White, "Agrarian Refonn," 140.
109 Duiker, Communist Road, 143.
110 Ibid. During the mass mobilization for rent campaign in late 1952 and early 1953, membership in the
Peasant Associations rose sharply. For example, in the Viet Bac villages, membership rose from 4,930 to
8,042 members during the campaign. Later Party rectification campaigns to purify the Party of exploitative
elements also indicated that a large number of landlords and rich peasants joined the Party during these
years. White, "Agrarian Refonn," 177.
III Ibid. The official 1960 census for North Vietnam had the total population at sixteen million inhabitants,
80% of which were involved in agriculture. While the population certainly was larger in 1960, the figure
does provide a framework for interpreting the low number of peasants involved in the peasants'
associations. White, "Land Refonn in North Vietnam," (Agency for International Development, June
1970), 1.
107
108
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often could not earn enough rice."

112

The Party began to respond to the situation and

show signs of greater concentration on the anti-feudal struggle with the Second Congress
of the Party in February 1951.

Toward a More Radical Land Reform: 1951-1953

Throughout WWII and the following conflict with the French, the Vietnamese
Communists in the interests of maintaining the national united front had maintained their
overall policy of rent and interest reductions in combination with the redistribution of
large landholdings owned by Vietnamese and French traitors. While national liberation
remained the top priority in the minds of the Party leadership, signs of an increased
emphasis on the anti-feudal struggle began to surface with the Second National Congress
of the Party in February 1951. One clear sign of future change was in the Second
Congress' formation of the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP), which reestablished official
communist leadership and reaffirmed the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the Vietnamese
revolution. The explicit recognition of communist leadership represented a move away
from the policies of the national united front, which attempted to cloak the Party's role in
order to attract moderate elements, and foreshadowed an increased emphasis on the
domestic class struggle against feudal forces in the years to come. Another sign of the
elevated importance of the anti-feudal struggle came in Truong Chinh's keynote report,
"On the Vietnamese Revolution," in which he openly articulated socialism as the goal of
the revolution and "new" or ''people's'' democracy as the means to get there:
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People's democracy is a transitional step toward socialism. Whether the
advance to socialism is rapid or slow depends on different conditions in
each people's democratic country....
Under the leadership of the working class, and with the working
people as the motive force, our revolution not only aims at fulfilling the
anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist tasks but also at vigorously developing
the people's democratic refme, at the same time, creating conditions for
the advance to socialism. II
In recognizing socialism as the goal and people's democracy as a transitional stage,
Truong Chinh was reaffirming the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the revolution and of
the new Vietnam Workers' Party, while pressing his colleagues to begin to take active
steps toward laying down the foundations for the advance to socialism.
For Truong Chinh and many other leaders, creating conditions for the advance to
socialism meant paying more attention to the anti-feudal struggle in the countryside. In
the same report, Truong stated, "From the class point of view, the landlord class is an
enemy of the revolution. The more the revolution advances and the more democratic
reforms are promoted, the stronger the antagonistic reaction of the landlord class will
\

be.,,1l4 Placing the anti-feudal struggle on a level nearly equal with that of the antiimperialist struggle, he continued, "To gain independence and democracy and advance to
the realization of socialism, the main problem facing us is now to fulfill the task of
national liberation and carry out the objective of 'land to the tillers'" (emphasis mine). I 15
In order to carry out the objective of "land to the tillers," according to Chinh, the antifeudal struggle would have to be carried out "step by step" so as to develop the

113 Truong Chinh, "On the Vietnamese Revolution," (Report to the Second National Congress of the Party,
February 1951), in Selected Writings, 294, 335.
114 Ibid., 325.
115 Ibid., 346.
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revolutionary forces ofthe Vietnamese people "while maintaining broad national unity
with the aim of waging the war ofresistance.,,116
Though not the first time mentioning it, Truong Chinh also declared that the
peasantry was playing "the most important role in the national economy and [was]
making the greatest contribution ofmanpower and resources to the war of resistance."
"Without the participation ofthe peasantry," he emphasized, "the Vietnamese revolution
certainly cannot succeed.,,117 At the same time, he also rebuked cadres ''who want to
confiscate all the land owned by the landlords right away and share it out among the
peasants." He stated,
We must realize that we are engaged in a war of resistance, and therefore
cannot yet throw all our forces into land reform, that we can only carry out
land reform in the free zones...and only in those free zones where certain
conditions exist: where there is a relatively stable political situation, where
the peasant masses are demanding reform, and where cadres are available
to organize it. 118
While still subordinating land reform to the interests of national liberation and a broad
\

coalition of patriotic forces in 1951, signs of more drastic change and concentration on
the anti-feudal struggle in the Party could already be seen in Truong Chinh's
characterization of the immediate tasks of the revolution to include not only national
liberation but also redistribution of land and "sowing the seeds of socialism." The clear
implication was that after victory in the War of Resistance, radical land reform would be
the top priority for the revolution.
In contrast to Truong Chinh, Ho Chi Minh gave little attention to the anti-feudal
struggle in his report to the Second Congress. Other than a reaffirmation of the moderate
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land policy under the Viet Minh, Ho made no specific references to future land
redistribution, the slogan giving "land to the tillers," or the landlord class as an enemy of
the revolution. Ho's report concentrated on the anti-imperialist task and focused
thematically on military realities, long-term resistance, developing the army and the need
for patriotic emulation. Perhaps more sensitive to calls for radical land reform policies
for fear of alienating moderate elements, breaking up the national united front, and
weakening the resistance, Ho clearly subordinated the anti-feudal struggle to the antiimperialist struggle in his report. Overall, as Duiker summarized, "Ho's colleagues
deferred to his steady insistence on the need to place the anti-imperialist over the
antifeudal struggle in Indochina, and they recognized the necessity of appealing to
moderate elements in Vietnamese society.,,1l9 Yet even Ho Chi Minh openly
acknowledged the goal of the Vietnamese revolution as socialism and the means to get
there as "new democracy" at the end of his report, an implicit indication of a future land
reform and the increasingly radical bent~fthe Party's direction: "To win back national
unity and complete independence, it [Vietnam Workers' Party] leads the entire people to
implement new democracy and to create conditions for the advance to socialism.,,12o
The Second Party Congress also represented the ascendance of Truong Chinh to
the top of the Vietnamese Communist leadership. His increased stature after the
Congress could be seen in a biographical sketch in the Party's official newspaper, Nhan

Dan, one month after the Congress, in which "Truong Chinh was described as the
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architect and the chief of the Vietnamese revolution, while Ho Chi Minh was its soul.,,121
Re-elected General Secretary of the Party, Truong's influence could be seen in the
increased calls for more radical land reform policies after the Congress. In March, just
one month after the Second Congress, he addressed the National Cadres Conference of
the Vietnam Peasants' Association for National Salvation. Even though he reaffirmed
the national revolution as the primary task in his address, he also reassured peasants that
land reform was in the Party's future:
Our Party's program is to prepare the conditions for giving each peasant
his own plot. The Vietnam Lao Dong Party (VWP) confirms the slogan
"Land to the tillers" as perfectly legitimate. When conditions are ripe, the
Party will resolutely lead the peasant masses to carry out this slogan.
However, if conditions do not yet permit and if any peasant wants to make
haste with the land reform, the Party will tell him "Please wait.,,122
Truong would not tell peasants to ''wait'' for too long considering the more radical land
reform came in December 1953. It is also significant that while faithfully disseminating
and carrying out the Party's moderate agrarian policies, Truong Chinh had given
\

indications as early as 1950 that the Party should move toward the "complete realization"
of the slogan "land to the tiller.,,123 Later, in 1960, he argued that the mass mobilization
for land reform undertaken in 1953 "could have begun sooner, for example by early
1951.,,124
Peasants had ample reason to believe Truong Chinh's words about the
approaching land reform. In May 1951, the DRV enacted a progressive agricultural tax,
which exempted the poorest 10% of rural households, charged poor peasants rates of 6%
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to 10% of their total agricultural income, middle peasants 15% to 20%, and rich peasants
and landlords from 30_50%.125 As Christine White indicated, "Many landlords found that
the rent they were collecting barely covered the tax plus the cost of transporting the rice
to the tax collection point, and therefore sold their land.,,126 At the same time, the Party
still had problems enforcing the rent reduction decree. Moise indicated that in the Red
River valley and northern half ofTrung bo (Annam), 30% of the landlords reduced rents
properly, 40% reduced rents but not to the extent required by law, and 30% did not
reduce rents at all. Over 70% of the landlords in the two areas still did not comply fully
with the rent-reduction decree.

International Context: 1949-1953

Events in the years 1949-1953 produced a number of changes in the overarching
context for agrarian reform in Vietnam., One of the most important was the French
parliament's ratification of the Elysee Accords in February 1950, which granted partial
independence to a Bao Dai government in the South. The move had two major
implications: first, it meant that the DRV had to contend with a rival government in the
South, supported by both the French and the United States; second, it meant that the
United States was increasingly concerned about a Communist triumph in Vietnam and
would likely support the French significantly in terms of weapons and finances. The
Elysee Accords were in part aimed at appeasing the concerns of the United States, which
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would not support the French effort unless they made attempts to win Vietnamese
nationalist support. 127
The Bao Dai government attracted Vietnamese supporters from wealthy
nationalist elements both in urban areas and in the countryside. As White noted, the
"French policy ofVietnamizing the war politically and militarily had a certain amount of
success. Vietnamese were increasingly used to fight the Vietminh, and the Bao Dai
government attracted many landlords, who changed their loyalties from the Vietminh.,,128
Aligned with the French and propertied elements in the countryside, the Bao Dai
government respected landlords' property rights; it offered elites an alternative to the
DRV's seizure of holdings belonging to "traitors and reactionaries" and redistribution of
these properties to land-hungry peasants.
With the Bao Dai government competing for popular support and allying with the
wealthy, propertied classes, the DRV had to clarify its position. More specifically, in the
words of Christine White, "The DRV n~eded to define more precisely the nature ofthe
future socio-economic system it stood for. Ifboth sides could claim to offer political
independence, only one was in a position to offer a concrete program of 'land to the
tiller. ",129 As landlords and wealthy propertied elements in Vietnamese society not
initially hostile to the Vietminh or allied with the French began to gravitate toward the
Bao Dai government, the DRV leaders had less incentive to continue with the policies of
the united front. "Civil wars," as Thomas Lutze stated in reference to the years 1927
1934 and 1946-1949 in China, tended to "give rise to more radical policies of land
seizure and redistribution as class cleavage became more pronounced, with upper and
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lower classes tending to support contending sides in the domestic conflict.,,130 While
Vietnam was not yet at the stage of civil war in the years of the "Bao Dai" rule, the upper
and lower classes were gravitating toward contending sides in the fight for Vietnamese
nationalism. Landlords had already been hesitant to implement rent reduction policies
and were hostile to the steep agricultural tax imposed by the DRV in 1951. The Party
emphasized its commitment to a particular class when it resumed overt communist
leadership of the revolution in 1951 with the founding of the Vietnam Workers' Party,
just one year after the French parliament's ratification of the Elysee Accords. Once
again, the Party had to weigh the costs and benefits of maintaining the united front and
the support of more bourgeois elements with the mobilization of the vast productive and
military capacities of the peasantry. Increasingly after 1951, the Party would come down
on the side of peasants.
Another polarizing force in the early 1950s was the increasing intervention of the
United States. Not only did the U.S. prtssure the French into creating the Bao Dai
government, but it also helped lead the push for the recognition among western nations of
the Bao Dai government. On the one hand, the effort for recognition was intended to
counter the newly created People's Republic of China's and the Soviet Union's official
recognition of the DRV. On the other, U.S. military and monetary support to the French
and the Bao Dai government intensified the war and increased DRV worries that the U.S.
would replace the French on the battlefield. While the influx of military aid from China
after Mao's victory in 1949 provided crucial support on the military front, the Vietminh
still feared direct U.S. involvement. The fears only increased after the Korean armistice
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of 1953, since U.S. attention could now be focused on Southeast Asia. The impact of
Mao's victory on U.S. willingness to intervene and support the French could be seen in
the words of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who called Vietnam and Southeast
Asia the southern portion of "a single Communist Chinese aggressive front."l3l
The Party thus decided on a two-pronged attack to combat the joint FrancoAmerican threat, namely to intensify the people's war and to seek a negotiated,
compromise settlement with France in order to forestall a direct American invasion. In
order to mobilize the manpower and vast resources of the peasantry to intensify the
people's war, the Party would begin to lay down the groundwork for a radical land
reform with the mass mobilization for rent reduction in 1952.
The later months of 1952 marked a dramatic shift in agrarian policy for the Party.
Whereas before, Party leaders had instructed peasants to "please wait," now they actively
encouraged peasants to press forward with their demands. In a report likely written by
Ho Chi Minh on the overall situation ot:the revolution in late 1952, the Party linked the
agrarian question to military victory. The report stated:
In our country "land and water" are synonymous for homeland. Heroically
defending the homeland, our peasants are defending their "land and water." In
order to win victory over the French colonizers and U.S. interventionalists, to
secure freedom and national independence we need an invincible force. We have
such a force in the peasantry. In the past seven years they have proved their
invincibility and their boundless patriotism...Hence, the time has come for our
Party and our Government to carry out a correct agrarian policy, to give land and
water to the peasants. This policy will add tenfold to our forces in struggle and
will hasten our final victory.132
Going along with carrying out the anti-feudal task "step-by-step," the Party decided to
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mobilize peasants to assume implementation of for rent and interest reduction. Rejecting
the early administrative technique for reducing rents, Ho Chi Minh announced the
beginning of the mass mobilization campaign in a national appeal on December 19, 1952.
Before talking about mass mobilization, though, Ho admonished the Party for not
implementing past agrarian policies:
One of our mistakes is that we have not correctly implemented the
agrarian policy promulgated by the Government a long time ago. Nearly
90% of our population are peasants. More than 90% of soldiers in the
National Defence Army, local guards, militiamen and guerillas are of
peasant stock. Most of the taxpayers and volunteer workers are peasants.
The peasants make the biggest contributions to the Resistance and the
greatest sacrifices to the Fatherland. Nevertheless, they are the poorest
people because they have not enough land to till. Reductions of land rent
and interest rates which are their legitimate rights cannot be undertaken
properly. This is a most injust situation. 133
What prevented the reductions ofland rent and interest rate from being undertaken
properly? Pham Van Dong gave a forceful and biting answer in his report to the Standing
Committee of the National Assembly and the Lien Viet National Committee in February

,

1953:
Here, I want to speak especially about the conditions of our
government in rural areas. There are places where this government has
nothing which entitles it to be called a people's democratic
government. . .It does not truly serve the peasants, but on the contrary
defends the interests of the landlords and serves the landlords while it is
carrying out the government's policies, such as the land policy, the
agricultural taxation policy and the corvee labor policy...
For a long time, we have been criticizing the administrative cadres
in the rural areas whose thought and workstyle do not have the mass
standpoint and do not correctly follow the mass line. Recently, we have
seen the impure organizational condition of the administrative organs in
the rural areas (resistance administrative committees and people's
assemblies). In many places, these organizations include a large
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proportion of landlords, rich peasants and despots or have been influenced
by them. 134
Pham Van Dong may have not have been very far off in his claim that many village-level
organizations contained a large proportion of landlord and exploitative elements. Before
a reform of village Party branches in the 22 villages that participated in the trial wave of
mass mobilization, the composition of the Party leading committees was 13.5% landlord,
15% rich peasant, 61.4% middle peasant, 3.7% poor peasant and 3.5% petty bourgeois. 135
These numbers are significant considering that close to 60% of the population in the
North were poor peasants or agricultural laborers. The answer to the disproportionate
landlord and rich peasant representation in Party leading committees at the village level,
according to Pham Van Dong and other leaders was mass mobilization. In the same
report to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly and Lien Viet National
committee, Pham Van Dong concluded:
This is a serious situation we must rectify. How can we rectify it? There
is no other method than mobilizing the masses with a free hand, relying on
the strength, awareness and ability of the masses to rectify it. 136
Having tried administrative methods of reducing rents and interests and failed, the Party
found that it had to mobilize the masses in order for the reforms to be implemented.
Several themes emerge from the examination of the reasons for mass mobilization
and shed light on some of the reasons why the Party pushed forward with a radical,
comprehensive land reform in 1954. One of the first themes apparent from the words and
reports of Party leaders was the sense that peasants needed to be compensated for their
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enonnous sacrifices during the War of Resistance. Ho Chi Minh made this clear in his
speech announcing the mass mobilization for rent campaign when he indicated that 90%
of the people's armed forces were peasants and that the majority of taxpayers and
volunteer workers were peasants. Ho Chi Minh also tied land refonn and mass
mobilization with the Party's military struggle. The only way the Party could fully
mobilize the vast resources of peasants, who made up 90% of the population, was
through land refonn and the implementation of the slogan "land to the tiller." At the
same time, Pham Van Dong indicated another reason in his speech on the necessity of
mass mobilization, namely the purification and consolidation of the Party. In a larger
sense, the Party could purify its ranks and mobilize the vast majority of peasants in light
of the changing overarching contexts for agrarian refonn in the early 1950s. The
establishment of the Bao Dai regime in the south, backed by the French and the United
States, intensified the war and made class cleavage more pronounced. The Party was in a
much better position to undertake the r'\.dicalland refonn and break unity with the united
front after Bao Dai made it apparent that he represented the propertied classes in the
countryside. Increasingly, the Party recognized that the costs of breaking unity with the
national united front did not outweigh the benefits of mobilizing the huge military and
resource potential of the peasantry. Ho Chi Minh and the leadership of the VWP gave
official recognition to this with the passing of the Land Refonn Law in December 1953.
These were the domestic developments that provided the backdrop for the
dramatic events on the international stage in Geneva the following year.
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The Land Reform Law and Implications for Geneva

Despite the mass mobilizations for rent and interest reduction, the progressive
agricultural tax, and the continued confiscation of French and traitor lands, the vestiges of
feudal ownership still remained in the countryside. As Table-3 and 4 indicate, if the vast
productive and human resources of the peasantry, particularly the resources of the poor
peasant majority, were going to be mobilized effectively for the resistance, then the Party
was going to have to go one step further than the mobilization for rent reduction and
implement a comprehensive land reform.
As Table-3 indicates, prior to the commencement of the land reform proper in
1954, native landlords still possessed 44% of their original holdings from 1945, a
substantial amount. In terms of the amount of land owned relative to percent of the
population, landlords, while comprising 1.8% of the population, still owned roughly 17%
(counting land that had been scattered as theirs) of the land according to Table-4. If the
\

land scattered is counted as being owned by the person to whom it had been scattered,
landlords still owned 9.5% of the land. Rich peasants, while comprising 1.2% of the
population, owned roughly 4% of the land in both "scattering" scenarios. Poor peasants
and agricultural laborers, while comprising 58% of the population, owned only 17.8%
(counting land that had been scattered as landlord or rich peasant land) of the total land.
When scattered land is counted as belonging to the person it had been scattered to, poor
peasants and agricultural laborers still owned only 23% of the land. The conclusion
suggested by the data seems clear. If the distribution of "land to the tiller" was the key to
releasing the productive forces in the countryside and mobilizing peasants in mass for the
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resistance, as Vietnamese Communist leaders claimed, then they would have to take
further action to redistribute land and break the hold of feudalism in the countryside.

Table-3 - Transfers of land to peasants from 1945 to the Beginning of Land Reform
(Early 1953/Late 1954) in 3,035 xa ofNorth Vietnam, which underwent land reform
between 1953 and 1956
Original
Ownership
French

Total Land Total Land
Transferred Remaining
(%)
(%)
98
2

Landlords

56

44

Catholic Church

48

52

Communal and
semipublic
Total

88

12

73

27,

Source: Tran Phuong, each mang ruong dat, table following page 70, in Moise, Land
Reform, 162-163. Calculations based off of the table provided by Moise on pages 162
163.
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Table- 4: Changes in the number of households and amount ofland owned by various
classes between 1945 and 1953: 93 xa and 31 thon of North Vietnam
Before August 1945
Households
Number %
French

Land Owned
Mau

%

960

0.8

1,921

1.6

Catholic
Church
Landlords

3

0.0

1,985

3.3

27,338 22.5

Rich Peasants

1,278

2.2

8,651

Middle Peasants

18,422

32.9 36,849 30.4

Poor Peasants

20,246

35.4

13,151

10.8

Laborers

11,785

20.6

1,513

1.2

Other laboring
Classes
Communal and
semipublic

3,480

6.1

911

0.7

7.1

29,844 24.6

1953 (Before Land Reform
Households
\

French
Catholic Church
Landlords
Rich Peasants
Middle Peasants
Poor Peasants
Laborers
Other laboring classes
Communal and semipublic land

Number

%

3
1,311
854
23,774
30,706
10,216
3,736

0.0
1.8
1.2
33.6
43.5
14.5
5.3

Land Owned*
Mau
1,169
1,908
27,071
5,359
42,095
19,065
2,600
973
27,420

%
1.0
1.6
17.3
4.4
34.6
15.7
2.1
0.8
22.5

Land Owned**
Mau
1,169
1,908
11,593
5,003
45,490
23,751
4,266
1,061
27,420

%
1.0
1.6
9.5
4.1
37.4
19.5
3.5
0.9
22.5

*Counting land that landlords and rich peasants had scattered (illegally, according to
retroactive decisions of the DRV) as still belonging to the landlords and rich peasants.
** Counting land that landlords and rich peasants had scattered as belonging to the
persons to whom it had been scattered.
Source: Tran Phuong, each mang ruong dat, table following page 82, in Moise, Land
Reform, 164-165.
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Land Reform Law
The stamp of approval on a more radical land reform policy came in two key
reports at the end of 1953 by Truong Chinh and Ho Chi Minh. In his report to the First
National Conference ofthe Vietnam Workers' Party in November 1953 entitled,
"Implementing the Land Reform," Truong Chinh stated,
Although the August Revolution of 1945 and the mass
mobilization for reduction ofland rent have brought some benefits to the
peasants and some improvements to the life of the peasants, the basic
demand of the peasant-land-has not yet been settled and satisfied.
It is now time to carry out a land reform, taking land from the
feudal landlords and distributing it to the peasants and gaining political
power in the countryside for the peasants. This is the basic method to be
used in the immediate future to replenish the forces of the peasants, supply
the war of resistance, develop production forces and advance our patriotic
struggle. I37
For the first time since the early 1930s, the Party would confiscate all landlord lands,
regardless oftheir stance toward the national revolution. Truong frequently made the
link between the radical land reform '\tld meeting the increasing manpower needs of the
resistance war, which he recognized to be a "long-drawn-out struggle." At one point,
Truong stated, "Its requirements in terms ofmanpower and material resources is
increasing daily. These are mainly contributed by the peasants; but the peasants, who
have little or no land at all, are poverty-stricken.,,138 In order to wage a protracted,
guerilla war from rural areas, Ho and the leaders ofthe DRV had to mobilize the peasant
population in support of the resistance and the Party. Ho referenced the potential power
in mobilizing peasants in his report to the First National Conference ofthe VWP in
November. He stated,
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Our power lies in the tens of millions of working peasant compatriots who
are waiting for the Government and the Party to organize and lead them to
stretch themselves, rise up and put to rout the slavery of feudalism and
colonialism. 139
Satisfying peasant demands for land was one obvious way of gaining such
support. Vo Nguyen Giap attributed the VWP's crushing victory over the French at
Dienbienphu in part to the great lift in morale and outpouring of "revolutionary
enthusiasm" produced by word of the Party's land reform policies reaching the front.

140

Over 200,000 peasants carried supplies over mountains and valleys to provide crucial
help to the People's Army of Vietnam during the Dienbienphu campaign. 141 He also
noted that it was of ''particular importance" to address the agrarian question since the
Party "relied on the countryside to build [its] bases to launch guerilla warfare in order to
encircle the enemy in the towns.,,142 Ho Chi Minh, in his key December 1953 report to
the National Assembly of the DRV on the passage of the Land Reform Law, also drew
the explicit link between land reform and mobilizing peasants for the resistance,
\

particularly in the long_term. 143 He stated,
The more the Resistance War develops, the more manpower and wealth it
requires, and our peasants have contributed the greatest part of manpower
and wealth to the Resistance. We must liberate them from the feudal
yoke, foster them in order to mobilize this huge force for the Resistance to
win victory. 144
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Ho Chi Minh and the leaders of the DRV were confident that land refonn would
mobilize the huge resources ofthe peasantry for both the resistance and the party. Their
confidence stemmed from the land refonn experiences of other countries, namely those
of the Chinese Communists in China. Ho referenced such experiences in his report to the
National Assembly:
The experiences of other countries have taught us that successful
land refonn will help us overcome many difficulties and solve many
problems.
In the military field, our peasant compatriots will take part in the
Resistance War more enthusiastically, thus helping the development of the
Anny and the mobilization of the people for voluntary labor to serve the
Resistance. Our soldiers will have less worry about their families and will
fight more fiercely. 145
While Ho did not explicitly mention China in this section of his report, it is clear
that he was referring to the experiences of the Chinese Communists. In 1950, the Party
had initiated a massive study campaign of the CCP's experiences during their War of
Resistance to Japan. The campaign, according to King Chen, "was carried to almost
\

every Viet-Minh unit, civilian and military.,,146 He provided a description of the study
China campaign in his book, China and Vietnam, 1938-1954:
Cadres were urged, sometimes even demanded, to read, discuss, and draw lessons
from Chinese writings. Some 30 to 40 documents by Mao Tse-tung, Chu The,
and Liu Shao-Ch'i were translated into Vietnamese. By late 1953,47 writings
had been published in Vietnamese and 193,880 copies distributed; of these,
57,305 were copies of 17 different works by Mao. Ho himself translated Mao's
On Practice and On Contradiction. The most popular were Mao's On Protracted
War, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, On New
Democracy, and On People's Democratic Dictatorship. 147
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In addition to the study China campaign, the CCP had sent forty-two land refonn
specialists to Vietnam in 1953 under the umbrella of the Chinese Political Advisory
Group, headed by Luo Guibo, to help with the Party's mobilization efforts. 148 As was
stated earlier, Chinese military advisers planned and often helped direct Vietminh
military operations. The combination of military aid and assistance from the Chinese
Military Advisory Group contributed significantly to the success of the Vietnamese
Communist resistance in the early 1950s. Evidence that Ho's statement referenced the
experiences of the Chinese Communists specifically could also be seen in the overarching
new-democratic framework of the Vietnamese revolution.
For the CCP, land refonn had proved to be an effective and essential tool in
mobilizing peasants for the resistance and the Party during its bid for power after World
War II. In his speech at the Opening Ceremony ofthe National Land Conference in July
1947, Chinese Communist Party leader Zhu De had stated, in reference to the link
between land refonn and peasant partictpation in the army, "In places where the land
refonn was satisfactorily carried out, the Party organization was consolidated, the army
became stronger than before and military victories were won." He also indicated that
"peasants support us in order to defend the fruits of this struggle.,,149 In the words of
Thomas Lutze, "Land refonn mobilized millions of peasants to take up arms and to
support in other ways the People's Liberation Anny that swept to victory in 1949.,,150 Ho
Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and Vo Nguyen Giap explicitly mentioned these themesmobilizing peasants to take up arms and to support the resistance in other ways - in their
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various reports about the necessity ofland refonn in 1953 and early 1954.
The overarching contexts for land refonn in the early 1950s also surfaced in Ho's
report. He stated,
Interfering more deeply in the war in Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos, the
Americans give the French and the puppets more money and weapons....They
have a plan to replace the French step by step, but continue to use the latter as
stooges in the implementation of their war policy. 151

For Ho Chi Minh, one way to undennine the American policy of intervention and
extension of the war would be to reach a political settlement. Ho frequently mentioned in
his report that the Franco-American enemy was "afraid of the world peace movement."
In order to bring the French and Americans to a negotiated settlement, the Party had to
speed up the Resistance War and inflict a significant defeat on the Franco-American
enemy. Nhan Dan editorials in August 1953 indicated that peace could only come to
Vietnam when the "resistance is stronger, destroying much more of the manpower of the
enemy and the puppets and making it il\lpossible for them to carry on the war of
aggression.,,152 The siege at Dienbienphu provided the Party with an opportunity to deal
the French a significant blow before the United States could directly intervene that would
help drive them to the negotiating table. In his "Appeal to All Cadres and Fighters on the
Beginning of the Dienbienphu Campaign," Vo Nguyen Giap indicated that a successful
siege would be a "worthy contribution to the world peace movement demanding an end
to the war in Vietnam-Cambodia-Laos, especially at a time when the French Government
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is being defeated continuously and has begun to have to talk of negotiating in order to
peacefully resolve the problem of war in Indochina.,,153
Ho Chi Minh and the leaders of the DRV expressed a desire to reach a political
settlement not only to avoid a direct American military intervention in Vietnam but also
to ensure the success ofland reform. In his report to the National Assembly, Ho stated,
For these eight years, our entire people have been carrying out the greatest
task, which is to conduct the Resistance War. From now on, we have
another central task, which is land reform. We must endeavor to speed up
the Resistance War in order to vouch for the success ofland reform. We
must exert all our efforts to implement land reform in order to secure
complete victory for the Resistance War [emphasis mine]. 154
Vo Nguyen Giap also mentioned in his appeal on the beginning of the Dienbienphu
campaign that the battle, the point of which was to bring France to negotiation, would
help to "ensure the success of land reform.,,155
Since speeding up the Resistance War meant increasing military pressure to reach
a political settlement in the hopes of preventing a direct American military intervention,
\

Ho's statement indicated that the Party also wanted to reach a political settlement to
ensure the success ofland reform, which was central to mobilizing the masses for a
protracted war with the United States. It is important to note that Ho believed land
reform was essential to the "complete" victory of the Resistance War. The increasing
intervention of the United States in the early and mid 1950s alarmed the Party leadership
and aroused suspicions of a future American military intervention. These suspicions only
increased after comments made by American politicians after the Korean armistice. In
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November 1953, then Vice-President Richard Nixon alluded to a future American
military intervention, stating, "It is impossible to lay down arms until final victory is
completely won."lS6

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles indicated that one of the

lessons from Korea was that the U.S. should "make clear its intentions in advance," so
that the adversary would ''take this into his calculations."ls7 The U.S. certainly was
making its intentions clear in its military and financial support of the French. According
to Ngo Vinh Long, "U.S. aid accounted for close to 80 percent of the French war
expenditure for the 1953-1954 period, and airlifts were organized from France, the
Philippines, and Japan for supplies to the French."lS8 Ho expressed worries of an
American military intervention at the 6th Plenum of the Party Central Committee during
the Geneva negotiations, when he told cadres that "our successes have awakened the
American imperialists." He instructed the Central Committee that it "must take firm hold
of the banner of peace to oppose the U.S. imperialists' policy of direct intervention."ls9
But if the banner of peace faile~ the Party needed to mobilize the vast resources
of the peasantry, the "invincible force" of the revolution in the words ofHo himself. In
light of the comments made by Nixon and Dulles, the Party needed to have the full
support of the peasantry in order to wage a likely protracted war against the United
States. There was also the risk that negotiation for a political settlement at Geneva would
break down, and Ho and the leaders ofthe VWP needed the resolute backing ofthe
peasantry in order to wage a protracted war against a world superpower with mammoth
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military and industrial strength. The Party, though, could not expect to mobilize the
peasantry through the continuation of moderate agrarian policies; it could only mobilize
peasants by satisfying their demand for land. Dissatisfaction at the slow pace of change
in the countryside, as stated earlier, was already growing among poor peasants and
revolutionary soldiers. Peasants had been making the greatest manpower, military, and
financial contributions to the Resistance War as well as the greatest sacrifices, yet for
twelve years, the Party had told them to "please wait" for land refonn in the interests of
preserving the united front. The mass mobilization of the peasantry for the resistance
could only be achieved through a radical land refonn, and that was the lesson learned
from the land refonn experiences of the Chinese Communists. For the CCP, land refonn
mobilized millions of peasants to take up arms and to support the PLA and Party that
swept to victory in 1949. The VWP leadership hoped land refonn would do the same in
Vietnam; it had to mobilize peasants on a mass scale before the United States directly
intervened.

\

The increasing intervention of the United States in the early 1950s and the
establishment of the Bao Dai regime in the South made the Party's decision for land
refonn easier. With the Bao Dai regime attracting wealthy, propertied elements in the
countryside, the Party had less incentive for maintaining the united front and its moderate
agrarian policies. The benefits of land refonn in terms of the mobilization of the vast
military, manpower, and productive forces of the peasantry more than outweighed the
costs of breaking unity with the national united front, a point only strengthened by the
increasing intervention of the United States. Land refonn would also have the benefit of
undennining a domestic political competitor backed by France and the United States in
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the South because its puppet troops would have to come from the peasant class.
Referring to effects land refonn would have on territories controlled by Bao Dai, Ho Chi
Minh stated to the National Assembly:
The enemy actively uses Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese and feeds war
by war. They are doing their utmost to deceive, divide, and exploit our
people. Land refonn will exert an influence on and encourage our peasant
compatriots in the enemy rear to struggle more enthusiastically against the
enemy, in order to liberate themselves and more enthusiastically to
support the Democratic Republic Government; at the same time it exerts
an influence on and disintegrates the puppet army because the absolute
majority of the puppet soldiers are peasants in enemy-occupied
territories. 160'
The Bao Dai government had no interest in curtailing the power of landlords since its
support came from wealthy, propertied elements in the countryside. Bao Dai's use of
"Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese" was now nothing short of civil war. While peasants in
the DRV would be rewarded with land for their resistance to the French, Bao Dai peasant
soldiers would be rewarded with the continuance of poverty and rural oppression.
Furthennore, the areas plagued the worse by landlordism were the very areas controlled
by the French and Bao Dai.
Only a political settlement could provide the necessary conditions for land refonn
and the mobilization of the peasantry. Truong Chinh laid out the necessary conditions in
his report to the First National Conference of the VWP in November 1953, all of which
would finally be met in the North by a political settlement at Geneva:
Only those places in which all the following three conditions obtain shall
mobilize the masses to carry out the land refonn:
1. A stable military and political situation.
2. Most of the people actively demand a land refonn.
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3.

There are enough cadres to lead the mass campaign for the reform. 161

In order to unleash the forces of violent class struggle in the countryside for peasant
mobilization, particularly for poor peasant mobilization, the Party needed to have
relatively peaceful and stable conditions. The complete transformation of centuries-year
old class and social relations was a traumatic experience for villages in itself, let alone the
prospect of conducting it while fighting a fierce, no-boundaries war. In the words ofRo
Chi Minh in his report to the National Assembly, "Land reform is a peasant revolution, a
class struggle in the countryside; it is a large-scale, hard, and complicated struggle.,,162
Areas conducting land reform needed security from outside attack during this period of
immense agrarian upheaval. In People's War People's Army, Giap indicated that the
Party "carried out with great firmness" the mobilization of the masses for land reform "as
soon as the stabilization of the situation allowed it.,,163
Party leaders could not create stable and peaceful conditions throughout the
\

country by simply launching an all-out military assault on the French in hopes of
completely expelling them from Vietnam, for that would draw the very American
intervention they hoped to avoid. Yet, at the same time, the Party needed to increase
military pressure on the French to bring about a political settlement and to acquire the
most territory possible before a potential cease-fire. The Dienbienphu siege
accomplished both for the Party. It helped "secure the success ofland reform," in the
words of Giap, by increasing the amount of territory held securely by the Vietminh and
by pushing the French toward a negotiated settlement. The more territory under its
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control, the more peasant manpower and military resources the Party could mobilize
through land reform after the settlement. That is why the acceptance of the seventeenth
parallel rather than the thirteenth or fourteenth, which would have corresponded to the
actual military situation, was such a significant compromise for the VWP.
Ho Chi Minh and the leaders of the DRV needed relatively peaceful and stable
conditions to implement land reform and class struggle in the countryside, no matter how
temporary, in order to mobilize the vast resources of the peasantry for a protracted war
with the United States. Qiang Zhai presented evidence in his book, China and the

Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, that VWP leaders decided in March 1954 politburo meetings
that it would be beneficial to temporarily divide the nation. l64 Temporarily partitioning
the country was beneficial to the Party because it gave them a large, secure and peaceful
area to conduct the land reform deemed so crucial to mobilizing peasants and winning the
long-term resistance war. While the Vietminh may have had the strength to defeat the
French on the battlefield within a few y((ars, Ho Chi Minh doubted whether the DRV had
the strength in early 1953 and 1954 to take on the vast industrial and military might of the
United States. He chided colleagues during the Sixth Plenum in July 1954 who saw the
"French but not the Americans." The Party would have the military and political strength
to carryon a protracted war against the United States after the mobilization of peasants
through radical land reform and the unleashing of class struggle in the countryside. The
Geneva Conference provided the Party with the very opportunity to create the peaceful
and stable conditions necessary for land reform.
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Conclusion

For the leaders of the VWP, a political settlement and temporary partition of the
country would not only deflect an immediate United States military intervention while
appeasing Chinese and Russian allies but also allow the VWP to mobilize the vast
productive and human capacities of the peasantry for a protracted war with the United
States. The leadership undertook the land reform for other reasons too, many of which
had roots in the historical development of the Revolution. Certainly, the Party felt
obliged to give peasants land because of their enormous sacrifices during World War II
and the War of Resistance to France. During those years, the Party pursued a policy of
moderation toward landlords in the interests of preserving the national united front. With
the establishment of the Bao Dai regime in the South and the increasing intervention of
the United States in the early 1950s, the overarching context for agrarian reform changed.
Now faced with a domestic rival drawing support from the landed classes in the
countryside, the Party had less incentive to maintain the united front. The Party decided
that the mobilization of the peasantry would more than outweigh the costs of breaking
unity with the richer elements in the countryside, which were beginning to side with the
Bao Dai regime anyway.
In order to undertake the land reform deemed so essential to the mobilization of
peasants for a protracted war against the United States, the Party needed relatively stable
and peaceful conditions. They could not simply "speed up the Resistance War" by
launching an all-out military assault on the French in hopes of completely expelling them

164

Qiang Zhai, China and Vietnam, 51.

•
75

from Vietnam, for that would draw American intervention. The only way to ensure the
success of land reform while avoiding direct American intervention was to find a political
settlement at Geneva.
At the end ofhis report to the National Assembly in 1953, Ho Chi Minh stated,
"To carry out land reform is to secure victory for the Resistance War." For the most part,
Ho was correct. Certainly land reform helps to explain why millions of poor peasants
sacrificed and suffered to support the Party during its terribly destructive protracted war
against the United States. While the Party committed a number of well-documented
abuses during its execution, the land reform campaign and its public rectification of
errors, in the words of Marilyn Young, only "deepened popular support for the
government.,,165 It also served to undermine any agrarian policies put forth by the
various governments in Saigon, since all of them relied upon the wealthy, propertied
elements in the countryside and could not match the attractiveness of the VWP land
program. Just as in China, land reform~n Vietnam mobilized millions of peasants to
support the people's armed forces and the Party between 1954 and 1975. In order to
conduct the mobilization through land reform, the Party needed relatively peaceful and
stable conditions in 1954. The Geneva Conference provided the Party with the perfect
opportunity to create those conditions, while at the same time avoiding a direct United
States military intervention and expansion of the war.
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